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Abstract
Governments are increasingly turning to the private sector to provide the capital, resources and/or
know-how necessary for development and operation of infrastructure. In some cases, the involvement
by the private sector will trigger coverage by an international investment treaty that overlies, and can
override, the domestic law and contract that would otherwise be applicable to the project. This paper
discusses the circumstances affecting when an investment treaty will apply and also highlights some of
the ways that investment treaties can impact governance of infrastructure development and operation.
While focusing on the relationship between investment treaties and investments in infrastructure, this
paper is also relevant for the connections between investment treaties and other activities involving
investor-state contracts (or quasi-contractual relationships) such as investments in the extractive
industries.
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I. Introduction*
Investment in infrastructure is a prerequisite of sustainable development. The type and availability of
transportation networks, energy, telecommunications, water and sanitation services not only affect
economic competitiveness, productivity and efficiency, but also impact quality of life, health, and the
human and natural environment.1
While governments have traditionally been responsible for developing and providing infrastructure
services as a public good, this is changing, and the private sector is increasingly playing a greater
role.2 Driven by difficulties in accessing the necessary capital to invest in development of
infrastructure and a lack of technology, skills and know how necessary for the projects, governments
have been stepping aside and delegating greater rights and powers to private entities, privatizing some
activities and operations outright, or involving private entities through various contractual and
regulatory mechanisms.
One key challenge faced by governments seeking quality investment in infrastructure is how to
attract investors. Although investments in infrastructure potentially provide investors with stable and
long-term returns, the long lives and incomplete nature of many infrastructure contracts, the often
significant capital required of investors, the highly regulated nature of infrastructure services, and the
public – and political – interests regarding the price and operation of those activities, are factors that
cumulatively make investors wary about these types of investments.
A country’s legal environment can assuage investors’ specific concerns about possible losses
arising out of changes in the legal framework governing investments in infrastructure. Generally, such
investments will bear the risk of general modifications in the laws, regulations and policies impacting
performance of infrastructure operations as those are deemed ordinary commercial risks. Yet in
circumstances such as where the government abuses its sovereign authority, and/or breaches its
contractual obligations, the investor will want to be able to seek legal recourse against the government,
and will want to ensure that there are avenues for such relief.
Concerns that domestic laws and procedures do not adequately provide these avenues have been
cited as factors chilling investment in infrastructure and other activities. In order to assuage those
fears, some investors seek political risk insurance (PRI) that can compensate them for, inter alia,
regulatory expropriations or breach of contract.3 Investors in recent years have secured political risk
insurance over roughly ten percent of foreign direct investments (FDI) they have made.4 Reasons cited
by investors for not obtaining PRI include the perception that risk is manageable without such
coverage, that potential losses are limited, and that they are not adequately familiar with the product.5
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Studies examining the role of infrastructure as an essential element of sustainable development are prevalent. For a
review of the linkages, see, e.g., Energy Access and Security in Eastern Africa: Status and Enhancement Pathways
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2014), pp. 8-11.
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Notwithstanding the government’s traditional dominance of these industries, there is also a long history of private sector
involvement in infrastructure development and services. See, e.g., David W. Gaffey, Outsourcing Infrastructure:
Expanding the Use of Public-Private Partnerships in the United States, 39 Public Contract L. J. 351 (2010).

3

See Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), MIGA WIPR Report (2010), pp. 55-56.

4

See Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), WIPR Report (2010), p. 54. The ratio of PRI to FDI was
approximately 25 percent in 1985, had fallen to a low of roughly 5 percent in the late 1990s, and then rose to hover
around its current level. Id.

5

See id. p. 61. In a survey of investors in conflict-affected and fragile countries, MIGA found that only 13 percent of
survey respondents reported seeking PRI, and a smaller number ultimately secured it. Respondents primarily gave (1)
manageability of risks and (2) limited nature of potential losses, as reasons for not securing PRI. Investors in the
extractive industries were the least likely to obtain political risk insurance. Id.
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One specific factor that may be buttressing investors’ views that they do not need to purchase PRI
is the growth in investment treaties. These agreements, which are concluded between states and that
require each state party to provide investors from the other state party certain standards of treatment
and protections –provide investors de facto coverage against losses caused by the host-state conduct
that is arguably broader than coverage provided under PRI and that does not require payments of any
premiums.
One narrative explaining why states – particularly capital importing states – conclude investment
treaties is that, by providing international guarantees against abuse at the domestic level, these
instruments give foreign investors the comfort they need in order to make large-scale and long-term
investments in the host country. In this sense, investment treaties are considered to provide the signal
and the safeguards that can be crucial for attracting infrastructure investment. To date, however, the
evidence is inconclusive on whether an investment treaty actually influences an investor’s decision to
invest in a particular location.6
Nevertheless, assuming that host states benefit from investment treaties due to those agreements’
roles in encouraging capital injections, investment treaties also present potential significant costs for
host states. The key sources of these costs are expanded legal obligations, enhanced options for
investors to claim damages, and the associated high costs of arbitration.
This paper covers those issues, discussing how investment treaties might impact the rights and
balances between states and investors involved in the development and operation of infrastructure
projects. The key message for states is that domestic law is not the governing law for issues of
deference, standards of proof, standards of liability, or rules on damages. As a result, and as has been
evidenced by investment disputes, even if a state takes action in good faith and that action is consistent
with domestic law and the infrastructure contract, a tribunal deciding an investment-treaty dispute may
nevertheless strictly scrutinize the government’s conduct, find it liable, and order it to pay damages to
the investor for breach of the investment treaty.7 Moreover, even if the government is ultimately
successful, the proceedings through which tribunals make these determinations can be hugely resource
intensive. Such arbitrations often stretch on for years and generally require each side to spend millions
of dollars litigating.
Over the roughly 15 years in which investors have been bringing treaty-based investor-state
arbitrations, many of the disputes have arisen out of infrastructure investments. Indeed, infrastructurerelated investments appear to comprise roughly 35% of those disputes.8 The fact that such a significant
6

For a recent review of studies examining the impact of investment treaties on flows of foreign direct investment (FDI),
see, e.g., Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Jonathan Bonnitcha, & Jason Webb Yackee, Costs and Benefits of an EU-USA
Investment Protection Treaty, Report submitted to the United Kingdom Department for Business Innovation and Skills,
April 2013, pp. 15-18. When looking at the impact investment treaties have on investors’ decisions, decisions regarding
whether and where to invest must be separated from decisions regarding how to structure that investment. As discussed
below in Section III, investors might structure or restructure their holdings in order to take advantage of treaties by
changing the location of their home country, not the host country.

7

The fact that international standards can and do trump domestic law inconsistent with those standards is, alone, not
surprising in the realm of international law. But what is surprising is that when deciding whether and how international
treaty standards should override domestic law, and what damages to order, tribunals do not always accord states the
deference typically said to be a feature of international law, much less the level of deference common for reviewing
allegations of harms to economic interests of business entities, as opposed to violations of the cogens rights and nonderogable rights of individuals. See, e.g., Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and Sustainable
Development in Investor-State Arbitration: The Role of Deference in Yearbook on International Investment Law and
Policy 2012-2013 (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014) (discussing standards of review applied by tribunals in
treaty-based investor-state arbitrations).

8

This figure is derived from ICSID’s statistics regarding cases registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional
Facility Rules. The disputes captured as being “infrastructure-related” are those classified as relating to investments in the
following economic sectors: information and communication (6%); water, sanitation and flood protection (6%);
transportation (10%); and electric power and other energy (13%). Other investments that are not captured within the 35%
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share of investors’ claims under investment treaties are connected with infrastructure investments
reinforces the importance of the focus of this paper: analyzing just what rights and protections
investors are benefitting from under investment treaties compared with what they would be entitled to
under otherwise applicable domestic law; and, correspondingly, what obligations and liabilities states
have assumed.
Structurally, the paper proceeds as follows: First, Section II provides a brief overview of
investment treaties on the basis that some readers will not be particularly familiar with these
instruments and their important features. Section III then goes into more detail on the scope of the
agreement, describing just what types of investments and investors are covered, and what this means
for infrastructure-related investments. Section IV discusses treaty standards in more detail, providing a
foundation for the rest of the paper, which analyzes how those standards impact and present potential
liability for government conduct in seeking bids, awarding contracts, and governing projects and
project companies.
These sections of the paper – Sections V through VII – aim to provide useful guidance for
government officials thinking about how investment treaties might unduly limit their policy space and
negotiating freedom, and how the agreements might overly expand state liability to private parties.
Rather than look at the investment treaty-infrastructure investment relationship on a treaty-standardby-treaty-standard basis, the paper takes an issue-by-issue approach in order to better illustrate some
of the practical tensions.
Some issues fall outside the scope of this paper, including a closer examination of how investment
treaties impact contract termination, contractual dispute settlement mechanisms, and how investment
treaties might shift parties’ calculations regarding whether to informally resolve disputes or proceed to
costly and lengthy arbitration. Those issues are nevertheless important to consider when assessing the
relative costs and benefits of investment treaties in the specific context of infrastructure investments
and more generally.
Finally, while the paper focuses on infrastructure investments, it is also relevant for a broader set of
investments where there is an underlying contractual or quasi-contractual relationship between the
investor and state such as investments in the extractive industries. Like infrastructure investments,
investments in the extractive industries give rise to a significant share (approximately 30%) of
investor-state disputes.9 Indeed, because the standards and analysis applied by tribunals in the context
of extractives-related disputes are often also applicable in disputes arising out of infrastructure
investments, this paper considers both. To strictly narrow the discussion to infrastructure disputes
would risk ignoring important trends and lessons applicable to those cases.

(Contd.)
but that may be related to infrastructure include investments in services and trade (4%), construction (7%), and finance
(7%). The ICSID Caseload Statistics (Issue 2014-1), p. 12. There are two important caveats to this estimation: First,
because the basis of consent to arbitrate these disputes may be an investment treaty, domestic law, or contract, it is
unclear that the 35% figure holds for just treaty-based disputes. Id. p. 10. Another issue with the 35% figure is that
disputes arising under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules represent only a portion of investment-treaty
arbitrations. Other disputes not counted in these figures thus include arbitrations administered by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration or ad hoc tribunals using arbitration rules developed by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law.
9

These include investment arbitrations under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules. Twenty-six percent of
those disputes have been in oil, gas and mining, while four percent have been in agriculture, fishing and forestry. The
caveats to the data explained in note 8 also apply here. ICSID Caseload Statistics (Issue 2014-1), p. 12.
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PART ONE: SCOPE AND CONTENT OF INVESTMENT TREATIES

II. Overview of Investment Treaties
Before launching into a discussion of the connections between investment treaties and infrastructure
investments, this Section provides an overview of the salient features of those treaties, and the
mechanisms through which they are interpreted and applied. It introduces the concepts that will be
examined and elaborated upon in greater detail throughout the paper.
In short, investment treaties are agreements concluded between states that require their state parties
to provide covered foreign investors and investments certain standards of treatment. They commonly
also enable foreign investors to sue their “host states” (i.e., the foreign countries in which they are
making the investment) directly in international arbitration for breach of the treaty.
While the exact content may vary from treaty to treaty, the large majority of investment treaties
share a set of core provisions. These are (1) the obligation to treat foreign investors fairly and
equitably (the “FET” obligation); (2) the obligation to provide foreign investors “full protection and
security”; (3) the obligation not to expropriate foreign investment except under certain conditions,
including the payment of compensation; (4) the obligation not to treat covered foreign investors less
favorably than foreign investors from third countries (the “most-favoured nation” or “MFN”
obligation); (5) the obligation not to treat covered foreign investors less favorably than domestic
investors (the “national treatment” obligation); and (6) the obligation to allow foreign investors to
freely transfer money in and out of the country.
Other provisions that may be included are clauses in which states commit to abide by “any
obligation” owed to a foreign investor or investment outside the treaty (the “umbrella clause”);
restrictions on the government’s ability to impose performance requirements on foreign investors such
as obligations to procure goods or services locally; and requirements to publish laws, regulations and
decisions affecting foreign investments.
The majority of investment treaties only impose these standards “post-establishment” – i.e., after
the foreign investor has already established or acquired its investment in the host state – but some also
extend protections to investors that are “making” or “seeking to make” investments.
The treaties also often include exceptions to all or some of the obligations. These exceptions,
however, are generally limited to protecting states’ abilities to take measures to protect their “national
security” or “essential security” interests. Exceptions such as those that can be found in trade
agreements like the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, which expressly shield measures aimed at advancing specified policy goals (e.g.,
measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health),10 are generally absent from or
limited in investment treaties.
As noted above, states usually give their treaty commitments added force by allowing investors to
sue states for breach of the treaties even though they are not party to those inter-state agreements. An
investor can initiate international arbitration against its host state alleging that the state has violated its
treaty obligations and owes the investor some form of remedy (generally monetary damages or
compensation) as a result. The cases are decided by private arbitrators, normally a panel of three, with
each side appointing one arbitrator and the third being appointed by agreement of the arbitrators, the
parties, or another individual or entity.11
10

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX(b).

11

The precise methods used to appoint arbitrators, and to govern other aspects of the arbitration, will be governed by the
treaty, applicable arbitration rules, relevant domestic law at the seat of arbitration, and agreements of the disputing
parties.
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The number of these treaty-based investor-state disputes has grown significantly over roughly the
past 15 years: The first investment-treaty arbitration was filed in 1987. By the end of 2012, over 500
such cases had been filed against roughly 100 different respondent host states.12
The awards produced in these arbitrations are largely shielded from judicial review or scrutiny and
are relatively easy to enforce as compared to a foreign court judgment. This is due primarily to two
treaties – the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States (the “Washington Convention” or “ICSID Convention”)13 and the 1958 Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”).14
The ICSID Convention only allows losing parties to seek “annulment” of awards through an appeal
to an “ad hoc committee” of three arbitrators in a proceeding that will be governed by the ICSID
Convention. The bases on which that committee can actually annul awards are confined to five narrow
grounds: “that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;”15 “that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded
its powers;”16 “that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;”17 “that there has
been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure;”18 or “that the award has failed to state
reasons on which it is based.”19 For any award under the ICSID Convention that is not annulled, the
ICSID Convention requires its state parties to recognize that award as binding and “enforce the
pecuniary obligations imposed by [it] within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in
that State.”20 By limiting disputing parties’ challenges against awards to the intra-ICSID annulment
procedure, and imposing strict requirements on its state parties to recognize and enforce ICSID
awards, the ICSID Convention greatly insulates disputes – and their outcomes – from oversight by or
challenge in domestic courts.
The New York Convention, in comparison, allows a greater, but still limited, role to domestic
courts. Losing parties may challenge the awards in the courts of the country where the award was
made, or where recognition or enforcement is sought.21 It also provides that state parties may refuse to
enforce or recognize awards if doing so “would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”22 The
ICSID Convention has no such “public policy” provision.
These arbitral decisions issued under investment treaties and enforced through the New York and
Washington Conventions can result in significant liability for states; but it is challenging for states to
know just precisely what type of conduct will trigger claims or require them to pay damages. A
number of factors drive this uncertainty. For one, the obligations are generally vaguely stated, leaving
much room for interpretation. Additionally, many of the awards, and a large portion of the briefs
revealing the facts and arguments behind those awards, are not publicly available, hindering the ability
of national and local government officials charged with implementing the treaties to understand just
how they are being interpreted and applied. Additionally, there is currently no formal system of
precedent or overarching appellate mechanism designed to promote consistency across decisions.
However, even if there were such mechanisms, there would still necessarily be limitations to the
12

UNCTAD, Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Issues Note No. 1, May 2013, p. 1.

13

17 UST 1270, TIAS 6090, 575 UNTS 159.

14

330 UNTS 38; 21 UST 2517; 7 ILM 1046 (1968).

15

ICSID Convention, Art. 52(1)(a).

16

Id., Art. 52(1)(b).

17

Id., Art. 52(1)(c).

18

Id., Art. 52(1)(d).

19

Id., Art. 52(1)(e).

20

ICSID Convention, Art. 54(1).

21

New York Convention, Art. V.

22

New York Convention, Art. V(2)(b).
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consistency that could be obtained given that tribunals in these investor-state arbitrations are
interpreting and applying not just one instrument binding on all countries, but potentially any of the
thousands of different bilateral and multilateral treaties that countries have signed.
While these factors combine to make it nearly impossible to say precisely what investment treaties
mean, one can identify what they have meant in specific cases, and what they may be interpreted to
mean in future disputes. Uncertainty arises both in terms of the treaties’ scope, as well as their
substantive obligations and the remedies available for breach.
The next Section addresses the first issue of scope, discussing the question of what “investors” and
what “investments” investment treaties cover, emphasizing in particular how treaty text and arbitral
decisions are relevant for investors and investments relating to infrastructure development.

III. Scope – Coverage of Infrastructure Investments
Whether an investment treaty will cover an infrastructure project and its investors depends in large
part on the treaty’s definition of covered “investments” and “investors” and how tribunals have
interpreted those terms. Because of the key role of those terms in serving as the gateway to treaty
protection, this section provides an overview of the concepts and some of the main factors that may
lead to, or preclude, treaty coverage.
A. Covered Investments
1. Asset-based and Enterprise-based Definitions
Most investment treaties define covered “investments” in a broad, open-ended manner as “any” or
“every kind” of asset, and provide an illustrative list of the types of assets that may fall under that
umbrella. The agreement signed in 2006 between China and India is an example. It states:
Investment means every kind of asset established or acquired, including changes in the form of
such investment, in accordance with the national laws of the Contracting Party in whose territory
the investment is made and in particular, though not exclusively, includes:
(i) movable and immovable property as well as other rights such as mortgages, liens or pledges;
(ii) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other similar forms of participation
in a company;
(iii) rights to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value;
(iv) intellectual property rights, in accordance with the relevant laws of the respective Contracting
Party;
(v) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to search for
23
and extract oil and other minerals;

Other treaties use a similar asset-based definition but narrow it by (1) providing an exhaustive, rather
than illustrative list of covered assets; (2) specifically excluding certain assets; and/or (3) explaining
that “investments” should generally possess certain characteristics. The agreement signed in 2012
between China and Canada employs each of those three types of limitations. It defines an
“investment” as:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) shares, stocks and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise;

23

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Art. 1(b) (signed November 21, 2006).

6

The Impact of Investment Treaties on Governance of Private Investment in Infrastructure

(c) bonds, debentures, and other debt instruments of an enterprise;
(d) a loan to an enterprise
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years;
(e) notwithstanding sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) above, a loan to or debt security issued by a
financial institution is an investment only where the loan or debt security is treated as regulatory
capital by the Contracting Party in whose territory the financial institution is located;
(f) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the income or profits of the
enterprise;
(g) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the assets of that enterprise on
dissolution;
(h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a
Contracting Party to economic activity in such territory, such as under
(i) contracts involving the presence of an investor’s property in the territory of the Contracting
Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions to search for and extract oil and
other natural resources, or
(ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the production, revenue or profits of an
enterprise;
(i) intellectual property rights; and
(j) any other tangible or intangible, moveable or immovable, property and related property rights
24
acquired or used for business purposes;

It then narrows the definition by stating:
but “investment” does not mean:
(k) claims to money that arise solely from
(i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services, or
(ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade financing,
other than a loan covered by sub-paragraph (d); or o (l) any other claims to money, that do not
25
involve the kinds of interests set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (j);

The agreement then provides an additional qualification, noting that for an investment to be a “covered
investment”, it must be “an investment in [the territory of one Contracting Party] of an investor of the
other Contracting Party … and which involves the commitment of capital or other resources, the
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”26
A third, smaller, group of treaties uses an enterprise-based, as opposed to an asset-based, definition.
The free trade agreement between the United States and Canada, which has since been superseded by
the NAFTA, is an example. It stated:
Investment means:
(a) the establishment of a new business enterprise, or
(b) the acquisition of a business enterprise; and includes
(c) as carried on, the new business enterprise so established or the business enterprise so acquired,
and controlled by the investor who has made the investment; and

24

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Art. 1(1) (signed September 9, 2012).

25

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Art. 1(1) (signed September 9, 2012).

26

Id., Art. 1(3).
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(d) the share or other investment interest in such business enterprise owned by the investor
27
provided that such business enterprise continues to be controlled by such investor.

A foreign-owned company established by foreign investors in the host state (“Company A”) in order
to construct, maintain, and or operate an infrastructure project in that country would likely fall under
the definition of an “investment” under any of the three formulations quoted above.
More questions arise as to whether and when other types of foreign-held assets relating to
infrastructure investments are covered. For example, a minority, non-controlling shareholding in
Company A would appear to fall outside the definition of a covered investment under an enterprisebased definition, but could be covered under asset-based definitions like those quoted above.28
Similarly a loan to Company A by a foreign entity would likely fall outside the enterprise-based
definition, but could be covered under an asset-based definition. Even if there was no Company A in
the host country, a contract or license held by a foreign individual or entity to provide services in the
host country, such as a contract to provide for transmission of electricity, to maintain and operate a
toll-road, or to treat water, would also fall outside the enterprise-based definition but could be deemed
to fall within many asset-based definitions.29 Indeed, under the asset-based definitions, a wide range of
tangible and intangible rights and interests could be classified as protected “investments” under an
investment treaty.
Merely holding an “asset” covered by the treaty, however, will not necessarily mean that an
investor holds an “investment” within the meaning of the treaty. Claims, rights or interests in an
infrastructure-related project in the host country might be assets with economic value, but can still fall
out of the scope of covered “investments”. This is because, as the definitions quoted above show,
treaties often include additional criteria such as requirements that assets must be “in the territory of”
the host state and must be made “in accordance with” that country’s laws. These requirements are
additional factors impacting whether an investment treaty will cover all or part of infrastructure
development, and are discussed further below.
2. Other Criteria for Covered “Investments”: Territoriality and Legality
i. Territoriality
The majority position on the “territoriality” requirement appears to be that it means what it says: i.e.,
that for an investment to be in the host country means that there must be an investment or a
commitment of capital or other resources located in the territory of the host country. Applying this
rule, a contract for cross-border sales of goods or services;30 business activities conducted by the
investor in the investor’s home state in order to develop and produce products for sale in the host
country; and expenditures and efforts in the home country to secure necessary regulatory approvals for
exports to the host country31 are among the types of economic activities that would likely not meet the
“territoriality” requirement.
Nevertheless, there are caveats to the territoriality requirement that may be especially important in
connection with infrastructure-related projects in the host country. For one, contracts for a foreign
investor to perform services for the host state have been deemed “investments” in cases where at least
some of those services have been performed in the host country, even though the majority of the
27

Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Art. 1611 (signed

28

For more on the issues raised by protection of minority shareholders, see, e.g., infra, Section III(B)(2)..

29

See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, paras. 109-117 (citing
similar decisions).

30

See Apotex Inc. v. United States, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, June 14, 2013, paras. 233-241.

31

See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. United States, paras. 160-176.
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services were performed outside of the host state.32Moreover, in at least some of the cases in which the
territoriality requirement has been applied relatively strictly, the governing treaty expressly stated that
an “investment” does not mean “claims to money that arise solely from … commercial contracts for
the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the
territory of another Party.”33 Not all treaties contain a similar exclusion. While states might have
assumed that such contracts would not be considered “investments” and therefore did not need to be
explicitly excluded, the failure to clarify the issue can expose them to claims that those contracts are
“investments” under a strictly textualist reading of that term as including “any asset”.
A third caveat is that different tribunals have taken different approaches to applying the
“territoriality” requirement. Importantly, a small number of tribunals have found the requirement that
an investment be made “in” the host country is satisfied if the investment is made for the benefit of the
host country. This appears to especially be the case where the alleged investment is a financial
instrument (as opposed, e.g., to a tradable good). The decision of the majority in Abaclat v.
Argentina,34 and the subsequent decision of the majority in Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka,35 are two
examples of this approach.
In Abaclat, the claimants – who numbered over 180,000 at the time the case was initiated – were
Italian individuals and entities who held security entitlements in international sovereign bonds issued
by Argentina in the 1990s. The issue was whether those securities, which were purchased by retail
investors on secondary markets, denominated in foreign currency, and governed by foreign law,36
constituted investments in Argentina. The tribunal determined that they did.
The tribunal reasoned that the test for whether financial instruments are “in” the host country was
different from the territoriality test that applied to other types of investments:
With regard to an investment of a purely financial nature, the relevant criteria cannot be the same
as those applying to an investment consisting of business operations and/or involving manpower
and property. With respect to investments of a purely financial nature, the relevant criteria should
be where and/or for the benefit of whom the funds are ultimately used, and not the place where the
funds were paid out or transferred. Thus, the relevant question is where the investment funds
ultimately made available [sic] to the Host State and did they support the latter’s economic
37
development?

The tribunal then proceeded to answer that question, stating:
There is no doubt that the funds generated through the bonds issuance process were ultimately
made available to Argentina, and served to finance Argentina’s economic development. Whether
the funds were actually used to repay pre-existing debts of Argentina or whether they were used in
government spending is irrelevant. In both cases it was used by Argentina to manage its finances,

32

SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, paras. 109-117 (and decisions
cited therein).

33

This provision, which is found in Article 1139(i) of the NAFTA, was cited by the tribunal in Apotex, Inc. v. United States
as being relevant to its determination that the claimant’s activities in its home country related to sales of products in the
host country did not constitute an investment in the host country. Apotex Inc. v. United States, paras. 230-233.

34

Abaclat v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, August 4, 2011, paras. 343-387.

35

Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/09/2, Award, Oct. 31, 2012.

36

Cf. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. et al. v. United States, Award, para. 88, citing Bayview, Award on
Jurisdiction, paras. 98-99 (“[A] salient characteristic of an investment covered by the protection of NAFTA Chapter
Eleven would be that the investment is primarily regulated by the law of a state other than the state of the investor’s
nationality, and that this law is created and applied by that state which is not the state which is not the state of the
investor’s nationality.”).

37

Abaclat v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 374.
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and as such must be considered to have contributed to Argentina’s economic development and
38
thus to have been made in Argentina.

The dissenting arbitrator in Abaclat took issue with the tribunal’s decision as improperly disregarding
the “territoriality” requirement. He noted, however, that it would be a closer question and less of a
departure from other arbitral decisions if – rather than being issued as part of a broad plan to raise
funds and reduce debt – the bonds had been specifically issued in order to fund a particular project
(e.g., an infrastructure investment) in the host country.39 Based on this distinction, bonds, loans and
other instruments used specifically to finance infrastructure projects may more easily qualify as
investments than other more general or commercial financial instruments. Given the crucial role that
infrastructure plays in economic development, there could be strong arguments that bondholders
would have protected investments under the “benefits” test if the bond had been issued to fund an
infrastructure project.
While relatively recent and undoubtedly controversial, it appears that the majority decision in
Abaclat has attracted at least some followers. In Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka, the majority adopted the
test developed by the Abaclat majority and determined that an oil price hedging contract between Sri
Lanka’s state-owned oil company and Deutsche Bank was an investment by Deutsche Bank in Sri
Lanka, notwithstanding the fact that the contract had been predominantly prepared by branches of
Deutsche Bank outside Sri Lanka, was governed by English law, and selected English courts as the
proper forum for dispute resolution. The tribunal concluded:
In the present case, it is undisputed that the funds paid by Deutsche Bank in execution of the
Hedging Agreement were made available to Sri Lanka, were linked to an activity taking place in
Sri Lanka and served to finance its economy which is oil dependent. The Tribunal therefore
40
decides that the condition of a territorial nexus with Sri Lanka is satisfied.

In reaching that finding, the tribunal rejected Sri Lanka’s argument that the “purpose of the BIT was
not to provide a method of enforcement for transnational debt claims but to protect foreign investment,
i.e., inward investment, from regulatory abuse.”41
Based on these decisions, and as clearly illustrated by the Abaclat case and its mass of claimants, a
government or government entity could find itself subject to treaty claims from a wide range of
individuals and entities that directly or indirectly funded an infrastructure project through debt or
equity. Additionally, as noted above, contracts for performance of services in the host country relating
to development of infrastructure would likely also be covered under the treaty unless the treaty
expressly said otherwise.42 This would even be the case if a significant portion of the services were
performed outside of the host state.43
These broad interpretations of the term “investment” largely derive from tribunals’ decisions to
apply strict textualist interpretations of the treaties, declining to read in limitations to the scope of the
term unless those limitations are expressly stated. An effect of this interpretive approach is that treaties
are increasingly growing longer, with drafters adding new language to clearly carve out some types of
assets from the agreements’ protection. As noted above, some treaties now include provisions stating
that cross-border contracts for sales of goods or services are not “investments”; other treaties expressly

38

Id. at para. 378.

39

Abaclat v. Argentina, Dissenting Opinion, Oct. 28, 2011, paras. 107-109.

40

Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka, para. 292.

41

Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka, para. 224.

42

See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. United States, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, June 14, 2013, para. 234 (discussing
Mondev v. United States, Award, Oct. 11, 2012).

43

See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, paras. 109-117 (and
cases cited therein).
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exclude sovereign bonds and other financial products. The 2008 agreement between Canada and Peru,
for example, contains a number of relevant exclusions. It states:
investment means:
(I) an enterprise;
(II) an equity security of an enterprise;
(III) a debt security of an enterprise
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity of the debt security is at least three years,
but does not include a debt security, regardless of original maturity, of a state enterprise;
(IV) a loan to an enterprise
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or
(ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years,
but does not include a loan, regardless of original maturity, to a state enterprise;
(V)
(i) notwithstanding subparagraphs (III) and (IV) above, a loan to or debt security issued by a
financial institution is an investment only where the loan or debt security is treated as regulatory
capital by the Party in whose territory the financial institution is located, and
(ii) a loan granted by or debt security owned by a financial institution, other than a loan to or
debt security of a financial institution referred to in (i), is not an investment;
for greater certainty:
(iii) a loan to, or debt security issued by, a Party or a state enterprise thereof is not an investment;
and
(iv) a loan granted by or debt security owned by a cross-border financial service provider, other
than a loan to or debt security issued by a financial institution, is an investment if such loan or
44
debt security meets the criteria for investments set out elsewhere in this Article.

Of course, this discussion of the meaning of “territoriality” only reflects general patterns that can be
observed from publicly available decisions under different treaties. The actual scope of protection
authorized in a particular dispute will depend on the language of the treaty and the specifics of the
particular case, the identity of the arbitrators, and the persuasiveness of the parties’ legal and factual
presentations. Each decision that has been rendered, however, signals a possible similar outcome in a
future dispute, thus putting governments on notice of the ways in which a tribunal might deem them to
have granted protections to a broader range of “investments” than originally anticipated or intended.
ii. Legality
Another common requirement of an investment is that it must be invested “in accordance with the
law” of the host state. The emerging pattern in the cases seems to be that this can remove assets or
investments from the treaty’s coverage if they are made through fraud, corruption, or other non-trivial
violations of the host state’s law. Other misconduct such as a breach of formalities regarding approval
and registration of foreign investment, breach of contract, violations of principles of international law
and public policy, and illegality in the operation (as opposed to the making of the investment), are all
factors that tribunals are less inclined to view as causing what would otherwise be a covered
“investment” to fall outside of the treaty’s protection. This section reviews some of the cases
illustrating these issues.

44

Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Art. 1 (signed
November 14, 2006).
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a. Investments Established Through Fraud or Corruption
The legality requirement has been applied most clearly in disputes where the investment was secured
through bribery, corruption or fraud. A key arbitral decision addressing this issue is Inceysa v. El
Salvador45. In that case, El Salvador’s Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources sought bids
to secure service contracts for installation, management and operation of emission inspection and
control stations. Roughly two years after securing the contract, the successful bidder, Inceysa, brought
a claim against El Salvador alleging the country had failed to perform its part of the bargain and
breached the investment treaty between El Salvador and Spain. El Salvador responded that the
governing treaty– like many other investment treaties – required investments to be made in accordance
with El Salvador’s law and, due to Inceysa’s illegal conduct when making the investment, it had no
rights to bring a treaty claim.
Evidence submitted in the arbitration established to the tribunal’s satisfaction that during the bid
proceedings, Inceysa had submitted a range of false information that overstated its financial health,
exaggerated its experience and capacity to perform the contract, concealed information regarding its
affiliation with another bidder, and falsely portrayed the identity and experience of its strategic
partner. These misrepresentations and omissions related to the key criteria that the government
evaluated when considering the bids, enabling it to secure a contract it otherwise would not have been
able to obtain.46
According to the tribunal, Inceysa’s conduct in the making of the investment violated various rules
and principles of international law, including the principles of good faith and international public
policy, which were incorporated as part of El Salvador’s domestic law. Consequently, it concluded,
Inceysa “did not make [the investment] in accordance with Salvadoran law” and was therefore not
protected by the treaty.47
In another more recent dispute, the tribunal similarly dismissed the case on the ground that the
investment had been made in breach of the host state’s laws. In this case, Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan,
the tribunal found that evidence was sufficient to conclude the claimant had made payments to
government officials and their associates when seeking to establish its operations. Such conducted, the
tribunal concluded, meant that the investor had made no “investment” under the meaning of the
treaty.48
b. Limits to the Legality Requirement
Decisions have applied four important limits to the legality requirement. These relate to the
seriousness of the violation in the eyes of the tribunal; the source of the legal obligation alleged to be
violated; the role of the state in the violation; and the time when the illegal action took place.
First, arbitral decisions indicate that the “legality” requirement will not necessarily bar claims if the
alleged breach is a failure to comply with what the tribunal considers to be “trivial” obligations. This
may include requirements to comply with formalities relating to registration or approval of foreign
investments.49
45

Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, Aug. 2, 2006.
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See, e.g., Inceysa v. El Salvador, paras. 236-37.
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Inceysa v. El Salvador, para. 239. In this case, due to the language of the treaty and the tribunal’s approach, the issue of
legality was relevant to whether the investment was protected by the treaty and whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over
the dispute; it was not, however, relevant to the question of whether there was an “investment” in the first place.
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Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, October 4, 2013.
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See Luke Eric Peterson, “Amidst Thicket of Thai and Indonesian Investment Laws, Confusion as to Admission
Requirements Found in Some Southeast Asian Investment Treaties,” Investment Arbitration Reporter (April 10, 2012).
See also Vanessa Ventures v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/6, Award, Jan. 16, 2013, para. 167 (indicating
that compliance with reporting obligations was not required for jurisdiction); Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No.
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Second, at least one tribunal has held that the host state’s “law” does “not extend to purely contractual
obligations.”50 Under that reasoning, an asset acquired or owned in violation of an investor-state
contract may not be fatal to that asset’s status as an “investment.”
This issue was addressed in Vanessa Ventures v. Venezuela. Venezuela had run a bid process in
order to select a company with the requisite technical and financial capacity and experience to aid the
government in pursuing its aim of developing certain mineral resources. Pursuant to that bid process,
Venezuela (through its state entity, Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (CVG)) chose Placer Dome
to be its majority partner in pursuing the mining project.
Reflecting and protecting the government’s interest in ensuring that it knew its partner in the
mining venture, and that that partner had the necessary skills and resources, the shareholders’
agreements and other contracts governing the mining project barred Placer Dome from transferring its
rights or obligations in the project without CVG’s prior consent.
Despite those restrictions on transfers, Placer Dome sold its shares to Vanessa Ventures, a company
that “had a radically different technical and financial profile from that of Placer Dome”, and did so
without seeking or obtaining prior consent from Venezuela.51 After Venezuela learned of the sale and
breach of contract, it terminated the agreement and concluded a new mining contract with another
company. Vanessa Ventures subsequently brought an investment-treaty arbitration against Venezuela
seeking to regain possession over the mining rights.
Venezuela objected that the unauthorized transfer of shares violated Placer Dome’s contractual
obligations as well as Venezuela’s law on public procurement and administrative law. The tribunal,
however, rejected those arguments, concluding that the claimant’s shareholdings – though obtained
through a sale that breached the Placer Dome-CVG contract – did not violate the legality requirement
and qualified as an investment under the treaty.52 Although the tribunal subsequently rejected all of
Vanessa Venture’s claims against Venezuela on the merits, the tribunal’s approach means that host
states may be forced to litigate treaty claims by individuals and entities with which they had no prior
dealings, and no intent or desire to contract with in extractives, infrastructure, or other projects.
Notably, the Vanessa Ventures tribunal also stated that, in contrast to Inceysa, violations of good
faith or principles of international public policy are not violations of the “legality” requirement and
will not cause an asset to fall outside of an investment treaty’s definition of a covered investment.53
The decision thus keeps the “legality” requirement confined to law and regulation enacted by the host
state.
Third, tribunals have indicated that if the state or a state-owned entity were involved in or aware of
the illegality, the state would be precluded from later denying jurisdiction on the ground that the
investment was illegal. This issue arose in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia.54 In that case, the tribunal
determined that the underlying contracts for development of petroleum resources and related
infrastructure appeared to have been entered into through ultra vires acts of state-owned enterprises
(i.e., acts outside the scope of their power or authority) and to be void ab initio under Georgian law. It
(Contd.)
ARB/10/3, Award, October 4, 2013, para. 165 (stating the legality requirement covers “non-trivial” violations of the
law). But see Philippe Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3.
50

Vanessa Ventures Ltd. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/6, Award, Jan. 16, 2013,
para. 134.
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Vanessa Ventures v. Venezuela, para. 153.
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Vanessa Ventures v. Venezuela, paras 128-169.
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See Vanessa Ventures Ltd. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/6, para. 164. One of the members of the threemember tribunal, however, did take the view that the tribunal would not have jurisdiction over the investment because the
investment was not made in good faith. Id. at para. 169.
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concluded, however, that illegality of the contracts under domestic law did not prevent it from taking
jurisdiction over a dispute arising out of alleged contract rights. It reasoned:
[E]ven if the [Joint Venture Agreement] and the Concession were entered into in breach of
Georgian law, the fact remains that these two agreements were “cloaked with the mantle of
Governmental authority”. Claimant had every reason to believe that these agreements were in
accordance with Georgian law, not only because they were entered into by Georgian State-owned
entities, but also because their content was approved by Georgian Government officials without
objection as to their legality on the part of Georgia for many years thereafter. Claimant therefore
had a legitimate expectation that his investment in Georgia was in accordance with relevant local
laws. Respondent is accordingly estopped from objecting to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione
materiae under the ECT and the BIT on the basis that the JVA and the Concession could be void
55
ab initio under Georgian law.

The tribunal in RDC v. Guatemala adopted a similar approach. In that dispute, the respondent state
had argued that the private investor’s contracts for development and operation of railways in the
country were invalid under domestic law as they were not secured through public bidding as required,
and had not received the necessary congressional or presidential approvals. That illegality, Guatemala
contended, prevented the contracts from qualifying as covered “investments” made pursuant to
domestic law as required by the treaty.56 The tribunal rejected those arguments on grounds of fairness.
It said:
146.Even if FEGUA’s actions [as the government entity entering into the contracts] … were ultra
vires (not “pursuant to domestic law”), “principles of fairness” should prevent the government
from raising “violations of its own law as a jurisdictional defense when [in this case, operating in
the guise of FEGUA, it] knowingly overlooked them and [effectively endorsed an investment
which was not in compliance with its law.”
147.Based on these considerations the Tribunal finds that Respondent is precluded from raising
any objection to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the ground that Claimant’s investment is not a
57
covered investment under the Treaty or the ICSID Convention.

This limitation to the legality requirement is notable in that it would effectively override some
countries’ legal and policy decisions to strictly prevent enforcement of illegal contracts or contracts
secured through ultra vires conduct. Given the difficulties of rooting out corruption or other
impropriety, rules against enforcement can act as prophylactic measures preventing such wrongful and
usually opaque conduct. Furthermore, strengthening the force of those rules against enforcement, at
least some jurisdictions do not allow private entities to use doctrines of reliance or estoppel to avoid
the potentially harsh effects that a contracting party might suffer if its contract is later deemed invalid
and without force.58 As Guatemala thus argued in RDC, binding governments to illegal, ultra vires, or
improperly secured contracts could “severely and improperly restrict State sovereignty. Taken to the
extreme, a bright-‐line rule that a State is estopped from exercising pre-existing domestic remedies to
question the validity of a contract simply because the State had operated under that contract for a
period of time could prevent a State from terminating a contract initiated by bribery or corruption.”59
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Id. at para. 194.
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RDC v. Guatemala, Second Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, May 18, 2010, para.
140 (quoting CAFTA, art. 10.28(g)).
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RDC v. Guatemala, Second Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, May 18, 2010, paras.
146-47 (quoting Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/25, Award, August 16, 2007, para. 346).
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The fourth limitation on the “legality” requirement is that decisions to date have focused on the
issue of “legality” at the time the investment is made. Tribunals have not seemed to view illegal
conduct during the operations as impacting whether the asset is a covered investment. To some extent,
this may be due to the fact that investment treaties often state the “legality” requirement by saying that
the investment must be “made” or “invested” in accordance with the host state’s laws.60 Yet the view
that the “legality” requirement only applies to the “making” of an investment, and not its subsequent
operation, has also been applied in a case when the investment treaty defined “investments” as being
“asset[s] owned or controlled … in accordance with the [host state’s] laws.”61 Under that approach,
issues of illegality during operation can be relevant to matters of admissibility and the merits, but not
whether there is a covered “investment” that can support jurisdiction in the first place.
3. ICSID Criteria
To fall under the protection of an investment treaty, a claimant must show that it has a covered
investment. Additionally, in order to gain the benefits of the ICSID Convention and the pathways it
offers to enforcement, a claimant must establish that it has an investment within the meaning of that
treaty. According to some tribunals, the meaning of an investment in the ICSID Convention is flexible
and is coextensive with the definition of an investment in the governing investment treaty. This means
that if there is an asset that qualifies as an investment under the relevant investment treaty, it will also
qualify as an investment under the ICSID Convention.
In contrast, other tribunals have concluded that the ICSID Convention has its own inherent
definition of an “investment” which requires a separate objective test to be satisfied. Not only must
there be an investment under the governing investment treaty, but there must also be an investment
that qualifies as such under the ICSID Convention. Tribunals agreeing that the ICSID Convention
does have its own definition of an “investment” nevertheless do not always agree on what that the
elements of that definition are.
A few tribunals have required satisfaction of the so-called “Salini” test, which is based in part on
the premise that, as recognized in its preamble, the ICSID Convention was designed to promote
international investment that advanced economic development in the host country. The Salini test
requires62 investments to have four characteristics: (1) entail a substantial commitment or contribution;
(2) be of a certain duration; (3) involve an element of risk; and (4) contribute to the host state’s
economic development.63 That test, first suggested in Fedax v. Venezuela64 and then described in
Salini v. Morocco, has since been followed in other cases including Joy Mining v. Egypt, 65 Jan de Nul
v. Egypt,66 and Bayindir v. Pakistan.67 The tribunal in Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic further

60

See, e.g., Metal Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, October 4, 2013, para. 193
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elaborated on the criteria for an ICSID investment, stating that it requires consideration of various
potentially overlapping elements, which are similar to the Salini test: “a contribution in money or other
assets;” “a certain duration;” “an element risk;” “an operation made in order to develop an economic
activity in the host State;” “assets invested in accordance with the laws of the host State;” and “assets
invested bona fide.”68
A number of tribunals applying an objective test to determine whether there is an investment under
the ICSID Convention have taken a narrower approach than advanced in Salini or Phoenix by
discarding certain criteria. The tribunal in Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan, for example, rejected the Phoenix
tribunal’s conclusion that good faith and compliance with the host state’s law are necessary to be
covered by the ICSID Convention.69 Other tribunals have taken issue with and declined to apply the
“economic development” criterion.70
These issues continue to be frequently disputed. Different arbitrators and tribunals have diverging
views on the role of the economic development criterion and other factors, generating uncertainty and
prolonged litigation. One relatively recent case illustrating this is Malaysian Historical Salvors v.
Malaysia. In that case, the sole arbitrator who first heard the case rejected jurisdiction over the dispute.
He determined that the agreement between the government and the claimant in which the government
had contracted the claimant to locate and salvage the cargo of a British ship that sank off the country’s
coast in 1817 did not make “a sufficient contribution to Malaysia’s economic development to qualify
as an ‘investment’” under the ICSID Convention or underlying investment treaty.71 The claimant then
sought to have the decision annulled. The majority of the annulment committee accepted the
claimant’s position, criticizing the arbitrator’s interpretation of the meaning of an “investment” and the
role of the economic development criterion, and annulling the decision. One of the members of the
annulment committee dissented, and in doing so pointed to the policy implications of skipping an
inquiry into the impacts an investment has on the host state:
[I]t is possible to conceive of an entity which is systematically earning its wealth at the expense of
the development of the host State. However, much that may collide with a prospect of
development of the host State, it would not breach a condition – on the argument of the [claimant
seeking annulment]. Accordingly, such an entity would be entitled to claim the protection of
ICSID. Host States which let in purely commercial enterprises would have something to worry
about. Correspondingly, ICSID would seem to have lost its way: it is time to call back the
72
organization to its original mission.

As compared to other types of economic interests and activities, and absent exceptional circumstances
such as fraud or corruption in the making of the investment, contracts and foreign direct investment
projects for construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure in the host country would appear
to have a relatively easy time in establishing that they contribute to the development of the host state
due to the role of infrastructure as a prerequisite and catalyst for economic activity. But one can
envision a situation in which even an infrastructure deal winds up constituting a significant net loss for
the government, and a drain rather than a contribution to the economy. Nevertheless, tribunals to date
have tended not to scrutinize the fairness of underlying transactions when determining whether they
constitute investments.
Decisions indicate that the other Salini criteria would not be particularly challenging for a foreign
entity with an infrastructure concession to meet given that these investments are often long-term,
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hugely capital intensive, and can involve the private entity taking on all or most of the business risk of
the infrastructure operations. The decision in Salini itself illustrates these points: in that case the
tribunal found that the claimants’ contract with the government to construct a section of the highway
in Morocco constituted an investment in the country due to the contractors’ contributions of money,
know-how, equipment, and salaries to the project, the 32-month term for performance (extended to 36
months), and the various risks of the project, including uncertainties regarding potential cost overruns,
force majeure events, and increased expenses or challenges due to potential changes in the legal or
regulatory framework. The tribunal also highlighted that the “contribution to the economic
development of the Moroccan State cannot seriously be questioned” as the highway served the public
interest.73
Long-term loans to or debt issued by a government to finance an infrastructure project would also
seem likely to satisfy the Salini test. In terms of the “contribution to development” prong, and as noted
by the tribunal in CSOB v. Slovakia, although such financial instruments are not always investments
within the meaning of the ICSID Convention, they can be depending on the activities and projects they
fund;74 with respect to the other Salini criteria – those factors, as they have been applied, are not very
demanding.
Indeed, in Sri Lanka v. Deutsche Bank, after determining that only three of the Salini criteria
should be considered (commitment of resources, risk and duration), the tribunal concluded that each
was easily met by the hedging contract: It reasoned that even the bank’s acts of meeting and
corresponding with host state officials and negotiating contracts constituted commitments of resources
for the purposes of establishing that there was an ICSID-eligible investment;75 additionally, it
determined that the risk criterion was satisfied because, under the hedging contract, Deutsche Bank
might have to make payments to the government.76 It also stated that the “’very existence of the
dispute’” evidenced there was a risk.77Finally, with respect to duration, the tribunal did not deem it
significant that Deutsche Bank had the ability to unilaterally terminate the contract and in fact did so
after only 125 days;78 rather, according to the tribunal, the fact that the contract was negotiated over
the course of two years and could have lasted one year gave it an adequate duration for ICSID
jurisdiction.79
Whether a third set of assets or interests relating to infrastructure investments – contracts for crossborder sales of goods used in connection with the investments, or contracts for services performed
outside of the host country -- would satisfy an objective test for an “investment” under the ICSID
Convention would be a closer question that would depend on the facts of the particular case and the
views of the tribunal deciding it. Quoting the tribunal in Pantechniki v. Albania,80 the Deutsche Bank
v. Sri Lanka majority said:
[T]he same product can be an ordinary sale of goods or an investment depending on the attending
facts and circumstances of the case: “[i]t is admittedly hard to accept that the free-on-board sale of
a single tractor in country A could be considered an ‘investment’ in country B. But what if there
are many tractors and payments are substantially deferred to allow cash-poor buyers time to
generate income? Or what if the first tractor is a prototype developed at great expense for the
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specificities of country B on the evident promise of amortization? Why should States not be
allowed to consider such transactions as investments to be encouraged by the promise of access to
81
ICSID.

As those tribunals signaled, investment treaty coverage is not necessarily foreclosed for those
contracts as some arbitrators may view them as falling within the agreements’ scope.
B. Covered Investors
In order to obtain the benefit of the investment treaty, the investor itself must be covered. Investors,
like investments, are often defined broadly in investment treaties to include natural or legal persons.
For natural persons, treaties commonly say they protect those who are “nationals” of the other state
party. They may expand that (e.g., by including permanent residents of the other state party), and/or
narrow it (e.g., by restricting coverage of dual nationals).82
With respect to legal persons, treaties usually use one of three different approaches: (1) protecting
legal persons organized or incorporated under the laws of the other state party; (2) protecting legal
persons with their seat in the other state party; and (3) protecting legal persons owned or controlled by
investors of the other state party.
Definitions of investors – particularly those covering juridical persons incorporated or organized
under the law of the other contracting party – have given rise to a series of legal and policy issues
reflected in disputes arising out of infrastructure and other investments. Key questions relate to the
connected issues of “treaty shopping” and circumstances under which tribunals will “pierce the
corporate veil” and challenges relating to minority shareholders as protected investors.
1. Treaty Shopping and Veil Piercing
Significantly, tribunals have interpreted definitions of “investors” in ways that facilitate their
expansive jurisdiction. On the one hand, tribunals have held that – unless expressly instructed
otherwise by the treaty - they need not “pierce the corporate veil” and look beyond the direct investor
(which may merely be a shell or holding company) in order to determine whether the actual or
beneficial owner is an investor covered by the treaty. This means that if an investor in country A wants
to make an investment in country B, but there is no investment treaty between countries A and B, the
investor from country A can establish an affiliate in a country (Country C) that does have an
investment treaty with country B, and make its investment through that affiliate in order to obtain the
protection of the investment treaty between countries B and C.83 Because tribunals have expressly
permitted this type of treaty planning, investors are reportedly increasingly structuring their
investments in order to gain the protections of investment treaties (and favorable tax laws and treaties),
routing their investments through third countries in order to benefit from treaties that would otherwise
not cover them.
Notably, some tribunals have even declined to pierce the corporate veil where the alleged or actual
beneficial owner of the investment in the host country is a legal or natural person of that same country.
As an example of this scenario, a person country A establishes an entity in country B, then routes an
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investment back into country A through that intermediate entity in country B. In Tokios Tokelés v.
Ukraine, the tribunal allowed the investor to bring a claim against the Ukraine even though Ukrainian
nationals owned 99 percent of the “foreign” claimant’s shares and constituted two-thirds of its
management.84 The president of the tribunal in Tokios Tokelés strongly dissented, evidencing that not
all arbitrators (or states) accept the formalistic and expansive view of treaty coverage advanced by the
Tokios majority.85 Nevertheless, other tribunals have adopted the approach taken by the Tokios
majority, including the relatively recent decision in KT Asia v. Kazakhstan, where the “Dutch”
claimant in the case against Kazakhstan was a shell company owned and controlled by a Kazakh
national.86
In contrast to their apparent reluctance to pierce the corporate veil when doing so would limit
jurisdiction, tribunals have pierced the veil in order to provide protection to indirect investors. To
illustrate: If there is no treaty between countries A and B, and a legal entity incorporated in country B
invests in country A, it might appear that no investment treaty would protect the investment in country
A made by the investor from country B. But if (1) the parent company of the investor incorporated in
country B was incorporated in country C, and (2) there was an investment treaty between countries A
and C, then that A-C treaty could be used to cover the investment in country A. Cases have held that
the fact that the direct investor – the investor in country B – would itself not be covered, would not
matter unless the treaty dictated a different outcome. This was the case in Waste Management v.
Mexico, where a United States company was allowed to bring a claim against Mexico under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) even though the investment was made through
subsidiaries in a tax haven not party to the treaty.87
Some treaties do include provisions restricting such wide approaches to jurisdiction by, for
example, requiring investors to have their seat and substantial economic activities in the home state,
thereby limiting claims from mailbox companies used to facilitate treaty shopping.88Other treaties only
protect “direct” investors.89 Yet unless instructed clearly by provisions such as those, tribunals have
generally allowed investors to take advantage of their corporate forms and families to maximize the
availability of treaty protection – declining to pierce the corporate veil when doing so would deny
treaty protection but then piercing it when doing so would bring the investor under the treaty’s
coverage. One limit to tribunals’ rather permissive approach to treaty shopping is that they have
rejected claims by investors that restructured their investments in order to gain treaty protection after
the dispute had already arisen.
As is discussed further below, this expansive approach of treaty protection is significant because
the treaties can have powerful impacts on the respective rights and responsibilities of the host state and
foreign investors, particularly in cases where there is an underlying investor-state contract or quasicontractual instrument such as a permit or license.
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2. Special Challenges Relating to Minority Shareholders
Treaties generally do not include language that specifically excludes minority shareholders such as
portfolio investors from coverage. Tribunals, in turn, have largely declined to read limits into the
treaties that would exclude claims by non-controlling minority shareholders. Indeed, in addition to
permitting claims by minority shareholdings based on interference with their shares or rights as
shareholders, tribunals have also permitted derivative claims by minority shareholders seeking relief
for damages to the company in which they have an equity investment.
Permitting such investors to bring treaty-based actions seeking to recover damages for an
enterprise’s losses can have significant practical implications for the state as well as non-parties to the
dispute. For one, allowing these actions could subject countries to multiple claims arising out of the
same set of facts. Depending on the number of shareholders, the numbers of potential claimants
bringing separate disputes could be staggering.
A second issue is that allowing minority non-controlling shareholders to bring claims can enable
them to challenge government actions that the company has chosen not to contest through litigation
(e.g., due to potentially high costs of the proceedings and low chance of success, potential for
counterclaims, danger of adverse publicity and reputational harm, or alternative opportunities for
informal settlement), or has otherwise challenged and resolved. If, for example, a government requests
a renegotiation of an investor-state contract, and the company agrees, thereby reducing its profits and
the value of its shares but helping maintain the deal, minority non-controlling shareholders may bring
a treaty-based claim against the government alleging that the renegotiation was accomplished through
government pressure applied in breach of the investment treaty. Similarly, if a company pursues a
domestic avenue for dispute settlement, and obtains a court judgment providing relief, a minority noncontrolling shareholder lacking standing under the host country’s domestic law to challenge the
government’s conduct toward the enterprise could nevertheless try to package the issue as a treaty
dispute and independently pursue relief under the agreement for damage to the enterprise and a drop in
share value.
The tribunal in GAMI v. Mexico addressed this issue and concluded that, contrary to the positions
taken by Mexico and the United States,90 minority non-controlling shareholders can bring claims for
harms to the enterprise irrespective of whether the enterprise itself has pursued or secured relief
through other channels. The tribunal held that the fact that the Mexican company, GAM, sought and
secured relief before Mexican courts did not prevent the US company, GAMI, which held just over
14% in GAM, from separately pursuing relief and remedies under the investment chapter of the
NAFTA. The tribunal stated:
[T]he fact that GAMI is only a minority shareholder does not affect its right to seek the
international arbitral remedy. Does this conclusion need to be reconsidered because of the
initiatives of other shareholders in GAM? The owners of the other 85.82% shares might for
reasons of their own have chosen not to cause GAM to seek relief before the Mexican courts.
(They might simply have been defeatists. Or they might have made their separate peace with the
Government and abandoned any complaint in return for offsetting benefits.) That would not
91
disentitle GAMI [from being able to pursue its own NAFTA claim].

Minority non-controlling shareholders thus are not bound by the corporate decisions taken by the firm,
and may adopt their own litigation strategies for addressing alleged harms suffered by the companies
in which they hold equity.92
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A third issue is that permitting shareholders to collect damages for harms to the company could
result in those shareholders obtaining funds owed to the company and inappropriately jumping ahead
of secured and other creditors that might otherwise have had higher priority claims to those sums.
Because of these and other issues, such claims by shareholders against third parties alleging harms
to the corporation are often barred in domestic law unless special circumstances are present, such as
when a shareholder suffers a separate and distinct injury as compared to other shareholders, or where a
special duty such as a contractual duty is owed by the third party to the shareholder. Yet, although
there have been some exceptions,93 tribunals have not similarly applied those domestic law limits.

IV. Once an Investment is Covered – General Rules Regarding Government Conduct
As noted above, there is a group of core obligations commonly found in investment treaties:
•

the obligation to treat foreign investors fairly and equitably (the “FET” obligation);

•

the obligation to provide foreign investors “full protection and security”;

•

the obligation not to expropriate foreign investment except under certain conditions, including
the payment of compensation;

•

the obligation not to treat covered foreign investors less favorably than foreign investors from
third countries (the “most-favoured nation” or “MFN” obligation);

•

the obligation not to treat covered foreign investors less favorably than domestic investors (the
“national treatment” obligation); and

•

the obligation to allow foreign investors to freely transfer money in and out of the country.

Some treaties, though a lesser share, also include so-called “umbrella clauses” and restrictions on
performance requirements.
While investors may allege breach of all of these standards in a given claim, the most common
ground on which they succeed is the FET claim, which has become a type of “catch-all” provision for
allegations of wrongful government conduct. This section thus discusses the content of that provision,
then describes the meaning of the obligations on expropriation, the requirement to provide full
protection and security, the non-discrimination obligations, and the umbrella clause. Although it is
outside the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive or nuanced treatment of these standards, it
does outline the important contours. Sections V, VI and VII follow by describing in more detail how
these treaty obligations have been applied in various disputes arising out of different phases and
activities relating to infrastructure (and similar) investments.
A. FET
Allegations that the host state has breached the FET obligation are now a standard feature of investors’
claims, and appear to be the most common grounds upon which investors prevail. In less than fifteen
years, the standard has morphed from one that had been largely ignored in investment treaties, to one
that now serves as a type of “catch-all” cause of action for investors claiming to be aggrieved.94 To
date, the FET standard has supported successful claims for such conduct as a government decision not
93
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to renew a one-year permit for a hazardous waste facility in response to public concerns about the
proximity of that facility to the local population;95 a government’s decision not to accept a tender for a
radio frequency (despite a reservation in the treaty allowing the government to limit market access of
foreign investors when awarding tenders in that sector);96 a government’s decision to terminate a
contract (irrespective of the fact that termination was in compliance with the contract’s terms and
provisions of domestic law);97 government efforts to seize and auction assets to recover unpaid tax
liabilities (although the tribunal declined to find that those actions breached domestic law);98 and
efforts by government tax officials to interpret and apply new tax legislation (notwithstanding the
tribunal’s determination that the government actions were taken in good faith based on their
understanding of the law’s requirements).99
Assessing potential liability under the FET standard is particularly difficult as the content of the
FET obligation is infamously vague, and tribunals’ views vary widely with respect to (1) what it
requires (e.g., due process, transparency, protection of investors’ legitimate expectations, stability of
the legal framework), and/or (2) what standard of review to apply when assessing breach. In some
cases, the standard of review has been rather deferential to states, only finding violations where
government conduct is “egregious”, “shocking”100 or “grossly subvert[s] a domestic law or policy for
an ulterior motive,”101 and being resistant to expand the content of the obligation to include
requirements to ensure transparency and legal stability. In other cases, however, tribunals have applied
much stricter scrutiny to governments’ statements regarding the underlying facts and issues, and have
also applied rather low thresholds for finding liability.
1. Varied Decisions on the Meaning of the Obligation
To illustrate the spectrum along which these decisions fall, on one end there is Glamis v. United
States, in which the tribunal affirmed the relevance of the so-called Neer doctrine setting “egregious”
conduct as the threshold for liability. The Glamis tribunal stated that
… to violate the customary international law minimum standard of treatment codified in Article
1105 of the NAFTA, an act must be sufficiently egregious and shocking—a gross denial of justice,
manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination,
or a manifest lack of reasons—so as to fall below accepted international standards and constitute a
102
breach of Article 1105(1).

The Glamis tribunal acknowledged that conceptions of what constitutes egregious and shocking
conduct might have changed and continue to evolve since the 1926 Neer award, but that it was the
claimant’s burden to establish such growth in the content of the minimum standard of treatment under
customary international law (MST). The tribunal ultimately concluded that the Glamis claimant did
not meet that burden.
In contrast, readings of the FET standard that are more exacting of governments and less
demanding on claimants can be found in decisions such as Tecmed v. Mexico, Occidental v. Ecuador,
and Micula v. Romania. In Tecmed, for instance, the tribunal stated that the FET obligation
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… requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment that does not
affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the
investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from
ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know
beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals
of the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment
and comply with such regulations. Any and all State actions conforming to such criteria should
relate not only to the guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions approved
thereunder, but also to the goals underlying such regulations. The foreign investor also expects the
host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits
issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as to
103
plan and launch its commercial and business activities.

In Occidental v. Ecuador, the tribunal similarly stated that the FET standard imposed requirements of
stability and predictability, and “certainly” imposed an “obligation not to alter the legal and business
environment in which the investment has been made.”104 More recently, in Micula v. Romania, the
tribunal took the view that the FET obligation requires obligations of transparency, regulatory
stability, protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations, adherence to contractual obligations,
compliance with procedural rules and due process, and treatment in good faith.105
2. The Relationship between FET and the Minimum Standard of Treatment
One factor that has influenced some tribunals’ interpretations of the FET obligation is their view of the
relation between the FET standard and the minimum standard of treatment (MST) under customary
international law (MST). The MST is a floor below which conduct is not to fall, and is based on the
general and consistent practices of states “accepted as law.”106 Establishment of the MST requires two
elements: (1) evidence of state practice of sufficient “density, in terms of uniformity, extent and
representativeness;”107 and (2) opinio juris, meaning that states follow the practice out of a sense of
legal duty. While examining the content of the MST is outside the scope of the present note, it has
been said to apply in only three areas – namely, the administration of justice, the treatment of aliens in
detention, and the provision of full protection and security.108
There are two general directions tribunals have taken regarding the relationship between the FET
obligation and the floor set by the MST. One is that the FET standard does not simply codify the MST,
but is an autonomous standard that is independent of and goes beyond the MST. Pursuant to this
approach, tribunals contend that a breach of the FET standard may be found for conduct that is not
sufficiently egregious or outrageous to constitute a violation of the MST.
The other approach is that the FET obligation is the same as the MST owed to aliens under
customary international law. Under this view, when including the FET obligation in their treaties,
states were merely incorporating the MST standard. In other words, the FET obligation encompasses
the MST but does not go beyond it.
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A growing number of states have expressly tied the FET to the MST standard in their treaties or in
subsequent interpretive statements. The NAFTA parties launched this trend in July 2001 when, in
response to concerns regarding the potential breadth of the FET standard triggered by a few early
investor-state disputes, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, a body established under the treaty,
issued the following interpretive note:
Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law
Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another
Party.
The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate
109
international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).

Notably, there is evidence that such practice of expressly tethering the FET standard to the MST
standard will lead the tribunal to interpret the scope of the FET obligation (and potential liability
thereunder) as being narrower than under a treaty without such an express reference. Statistics
gathered by UNCTAD suggest that inclusion of language aligning the FET obligation to the MST can
improve states’ chances of successfully defending claims.110
It must be remembered, however, that even when states did not explicitly tie the FET standard to
the MST in their treaties, and/or have not subsequently issued interpretive statements seeking to
clarify that relationship, that does not mean that those states intended to bind themselves to a higher
autonomous standard embodied by the FET that went beyond what the MST requires.111 Various
tribunals have nevertheless read treaties’ silence on the MST to mean that the FET is not limited in
scope to that customary international law standard.112
Some decisions appear to indicate that the difference between FET and the MST is not significant
in practice. To some extent, this has arisen from a view of the “minimum” standard being an evolving
concept that has expanded over time to approximate if not subsume what might previously have only
been barred under a more exacting FET standard.113 It has also resulted from the fact that tribunals
have not always strictly required claimants to prove the existence of state practice and opinio juris on a
specific issue.114 These approaches can effectively unwind the narrow approach to liability under the
MST that states might have intended to incorporate in their treaty standards.
B. Expropriation
Investment treaties generally recognize that states may take or expropriate private property but specify
that, in order for those expropriations to be lawful, they must be done for a public purpose, in a nondiscriminatory manner, effected in accordance with due process, and accompanied by payment of
compensation.115
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Whether the treaties explicitly say so or not, they have been interpreted to cover both direct
expropriations (e.g., nationalizations of physical property and businesses) and indirect expropriations
(i.e., measures that, although they leave the investors title over their property, interfere with or impact
their rights of ownership, use or control to such an extent that the measures are the equivalent of a
direct expropriation).
Expropriation claims have figured in a number of infrastructure-related cases as investors have
claimed, with varying degrees of success, expropriation of their physical property, concession
agreements, rights of management, particular contractual guarantees, or other rights or interests.
1.“Sole-Effects Test” and Police Powers Doctrine
Some investors have argued116 and tribunals have found117 that the so-called “sole-effects test” must be
used in order to determine whether there has been an expropriation. Under this test, “the effect of the
measure ends the inquiry: if the investor has been substantially deprived of its property rights, the
measure will be considered expropriatory” irrespective of the form or nature of the measure or the
public purpose behind it.”118
The “sole-effects test”, however, appears to be the minority approach taken by tribunals; and states
are increasingly including language in their treaties making clear that that test should not govern.119
The trend is away from that standard and toward an approach under which tribunals consider an
additional range of factors, including the extent to which the challenged measure interferes with the
investor’s legitimate expectations, and the nature, purpose and character of that measure.120
States and commentators have also argued, and tribunals have similarly determined that the effect of
the measure – even if severe – will not constitute an expropriation if it is a valid exercise of the
government’s “police powers”. Under the “police powers” doctrine, non-discriminatory measures of
general applicability that are designed and applied for legitimate public purposes do not constitute
indirect expropriations, irrespective of their impact on the investment.121 UNCTAD has identified
several types of acts that have been seen to be covered by this doctrine:
(a) forfeiture or a fine to punish or suppress crime; (b) seizure of property by way of taxation; (c)
legislation[, regulation and judicial decisions] restricting the use of property, including planning,
environment, safety, health and the concomitant restrictions to property rights; and (d) defence
against external threats, destruction of property of neutrals as a consequence of military operations
and the taking of enemy property as part payment of reparation for the consequences of an illegal
122
war.
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2. Level of Interference and Denominator Issue
Over time, tribunals have adopted a relatively consistent approach whereby they hold that the level of
interference with an investment must generally be total or near total in effect and duration in order to
constitute an expropriation. While this seems to set a high bar for liability, the degree of interference
will vary depending on what the tribunal views as the appropriate denominator of the investment.
Various tribunals have stressed that it is important to view the investor’s investment in the host
country “as a whole”.123 Under this approach, an investment in development of oil resources, for
example, consists not only of rights under production sharing contracts – even if those are the most
valuable assets – but also shareholdings in the project company, infrastructure, equipment, and other
tangible property related to and employed in the project, contributions of money and other assets, and
physical possession of the relevant exploitation areas.124 In other cases, however, the tribunal has taken
a narrow view to identifying the relevant right or investment. Biwater v. Tanzania is an illustration:125
there, the tribunal isolated the investor’s right to “normal contract termination” procedures as the
relevant property right (as opposed to the entirety of the investor’s investment in the host country or
the entire bundle of rights held under the contract), and then determined that the government’s
interference with that specific right constituted an expropriation.126
3. “Expropriation Light” through FET
Importantly, measures that lack the severity necessary to render them expropriatory may nevertheless
be deemed to violate the FET standard. Consequently, the FET obligation is sometimes described as
“expropriation light”. A narrowing of the expropriation obligation thus has not necessarily translated
into a narrowing of state liability, as it has been accompanied by growth in the numbers of claims and
successes under the FET standard.
C. Non-Discrimination – National Treatment and MFN Obligations
The great majority of investment treaties contain obligations to provide foreign investors/investments
MFN treatment and national treatment. MFN treatment means that the host state is to treat the
investor/investment of the home state no less favourably than it treats investors/investments from other
countries. National treatment means that the host state is to treat the foreign investor/investment from
the home state no less favourably than it treats domestic investors/investments.
Depending on how they are interpreted and applied, these obligations can potentially limit host
states’ authority to draw important distinctions between different investors or investments, even when
done for non-discriminatory motives. Factors relevant to the impact these provisions have on domestic
policy space include (1) whether a breach requires intent to discriminate against foreign
investors/investments on account of their nationality; (2) how much latitude is given to governments to
determine when foreign investors/investments are in “like circumstances” with their domestic
counterparts, and therefore may not be given less favourable treatment; and (3) the role of the MFN
provision in expanding treaty rights. These issues are discussed in more detail below.
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1. Discrimination “on account of” foreign nationality
Governments may have a number of valid reasons for treating individuals or entities differently. When
enforcing laws and policies, for example, resource constraints preventing action against all offenders,
the desire to “set examples” or target the worst offenders, and legitimate changes in policies may all be
reasons why a government agency will pursue enforcement against one entity before (or without)
pursuing similar action against another. These actions may harm a particular foreign firm relative to its
domestic or other foreign competitors in the host country. Similarly, based on their design, certain
measures may have unintended discriminatory impacts. By specially regulating a particular process or
production method uniquely used by a particular foreign investor or investors, a measure may
disadvantage their investments in the host country. If, as argued by a number of investors in cases to
date, such selective enforcement or disparate impacts are deemed to constitute improper
discrimination, the national treatment provisions may unduly restrict governments’ abilities to
differentiate between investors or investments for legitimate non-intentionally discriminatory grounds.
Notably, a number of tribunals have held that an investor-claimant need not establish that the
government intended to discriminate against it on account of its nationality in order for a breach of the
non-discrimination obligation to be found.127 Additionally, although some states such as Canada and
the United States that have argued that discrimination must be “on account of” nationality in order to
be barred under treaties’ national and MFN provisions, they have nevertheless given some indications
that they do not believe an intent to discriminate must necessarily be shown. Pursuant to this standard,
a mere disparate impact on a foreign investor may not be sufficient to establish liability under the nondiscrimination obligations, but proof of discriminatory intent is also not necessary.
2. Identifying “Likeness”
Not all differentiation between investors and investments is illegitimate discrimination. Differences
between investors/investments can appropriately warrant different treatment. The key issue is whether
there are in fact differences that justify distinguishing between investors/investments and subjecting
some to separate treatment, or whether investors/investments are in “like circumstances” such that no
distinctions should be drawn.
The concept of “likeness” is difficult to discern in practice, and requires a case-by-case analysis of
factors that may vary in the context of any particular dispute.128 In some cases, the tribunal’s “like
circumstances” analysis has been used to limit liability under the non-discrimination obligations and
affirm that governments are able to implement measures distinguishing between investors and
investments in appropriate cases, such as when different investment projects pose different threats to
environmental protection, or serve different policy aims.129 Parkerings v. Lithuania130 and UPS v.
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Canada131 are examples. In other cases, however, tribunals have lumped together
investments/investors into rather broad groups, and have found that efforts by the government to
differentiate among members of those groups violate the non-discrimination standards. In Occidental
v. Ecuador, for example, the tribunal determined that all companies engaged in exports were in “like
circumstances”, irrespective of those companies’ sectors or exports.132
In addition to the factors a tribunal examines when assessing whether investments/investors are in
“like circumstances,” the level of deference accorded by tribunals to governments’ own “like
circumstances” analyses and consequent line drawing is highly relevant to the impact an investment
treaty’s non-discrimination provisions will have on domestic policy.
3. Using the MFN Obligation to “Import” Treaty Protections
Some investor-state arbitrations filed and decided to date indicate that the MFN may be effectively
ratcheting-up investors’ treaty protections and states’ treaty obligations by allowing investors to
“import” those commitments on matters of scope, procedure, and substance from other agreements to
which the host state is a party, altering the balance struck in carefully crafted and negotiated
investment treaties.133 Pursuant to this approach, an investor can scan the investment treaties (or
potentially other treaties) the host state is party to, select more favourable clauses and protections in
those other agreements, and use the MFN provision to benefit from those provisions that the governing
treaty alone would have provided the investor. Some arbitral decisions have even suggested that when
“importing” these enhanced rights and protections, the investors can unhinge them from their
associated limitations and exceptions. This arguably enables investors to create a “super treaty” of
strong protections that no country has been actually willing to conclude, but that the investors can craft
by piecing together a patchwork of only the most favourable provisions of existing agreements.
Another issue with the MFN provision is that it can prevent countries from being able to reform
and revise their treaty practice. If for instance, a country decided in 2013 to omit the FET obligation
from its investment treaties due to the difficulty in assessing or controlling liability under that
provision, investors covered under post-2013 investment treaties could nevertheless seek to use their
agreements’ MFN provisions to pull in FET provisions from pre-2013 agreements.
D. Umbrella Clauses
The umbrella clause generally states that the host state must abide by any obligation entered into or
owed to a covered foreign investor and/or investment. Key questions relevant to its impact on the host
state are those relating to the scope and nature of “obligations” that are covered, the range of investors
and/or investments entitled to invoke that obligation, and the type of conduct (i.e., commercial and/or
sovereign) that it covers. The broader each is, the broader is the host state’s potential liability.
Umbrella clauses are particularly important in investments in infrastructure as there will commonly
be some type of instrument – a specific contract, authorization, permit or license – between the
government and investor relating to the project and setting forth various rights of and obligations owed
to the investor and/or investment (as well as rights of and obligations owed to the state or state entity).
An investor or investment may be able to use the treaty’s umbrella clause to enforce those rights and
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obligations in addition to or instead of any other agreed forum or remedy;134 the state, in contrast, does
not have the ability to similarly initiate umbrella clause actions under the treaty and thus would be
limited to bringing contract-based claims pursuant to the contractually specified procedure or
otherwise applicable law.135
1. Relevance of Privity
One important question litigated in investment disputes is that of who can invoke the umbrella clause
and claim it is an obligee of the host state or host state entity? Must there be privity between the
investor/claimant and the respondent state or state entity? The majority position136 on seems to be that
privity is required, meaning that the investor that is covered by the investment treaty cannot use the
umbrella clause to enforce an obligation owed to one of its corporate affiliates,137 or owed to it by a
“public entity distinct from the state.”138
But decisions also go the other way, allowing claimants to enforce contractual obligations in the
absence of privity, such as when those obligations are owed to the claimant’s corporate parents,
subsidiaries, or other affiliates.139 Tribunals have allowed veil piercing in this context thereby
expanding the claims investors can bring against states while generally disallowing it when doing so
narrows jurisdiction.140
2. Generality of Obligation
Some decisions have determined that umbrella clauses protect more than contractual or quasicontractual obligations owed by a stated toward a specific investor or investment, but may also cover a
broader set of state obligations141 such as “unilateral commitments arising from” the host state’s
law.142
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3. Nature of Conduct Constituting Breach
The umbrella clause can and has been used to challenge conduct that is sovereign and commercial in
nature.
i. Sovereign Conduct
Decisions addressing umbrella clause challenges to sovereign conduct indicate that laws, decrees,
regulations, judicial decisions or other government actions or omissions that intentionally or
incidentally interfere with contractual or other obligations owed to the investor or investment can
breach the standard.
Thus, when the existence of an obligation or commitment is found, whether that obligation is under
law or contract, a government’s subsequent change to its legal regulatory framework can give rise to a
breach of the umbrella clause irrespective of such potentially exculpatory considerations as whether
that change to the legal or regulatory framework was a measure of general applicability taken in good
faith and with only incidental, rather than intentional, impacts on the investor.
In this sense, liability under the umbrella clause can overlap with liability under the FET obligation
as tribunals have increasingly read the latter to provide similar protections as the former. More
specifically, as discussed further below, tribunals have said that general changes in the law that
interfere with a “specific commitment”, or contractual or “quasi-contractual” promise to an investor
can be a breach of the FET obligation even when those changes were a result of measures of general
applicability and not taken in bad faith or designed to hurt the specific investor or investment. Thus the
FET obligation has played the role of an umbrella clause provision, with both clauses allowing
challenges of sovereign acts that interfere with contract performance irrespective of whether the
relevant action was taken in bad faith or was an abuse of law.
ii. Commercial Conduct and Impact on Contractual Forum Selection Clauses
While some tribunals, states and commentators have contended that only sovereign conduct can give
rise to a breach of the umbrella clause provision,143 many others have asserted that the provisions can
also be used to address purely commercial conduct. 144
One issue that has arisen with tribunals using the umbrella clause to take jurisdiction over pure
contract claims under the treaty is whether and how that affects or is affected by an exclusive forum
selection clause in that contract. According to some tribunals, exclusive contractual forum selection
clauses do not waive, override or otherwise affect investors’ rights to use the umbrella clause to bring
contract claims under the treaty.145 Yet other tribunals have adopted a different approach, holding that
investors are generally bound by the contractually chosen forum, but may bring a claim under the
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treaty if unable to secure justice through that route,146 or if the contract clearly reflects the contracting
parties’ intent to waive treaty-based claims.147
PART TWO: INTERPLAY BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS OF TREATY
PROTECTION AND GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

V. Entering into the Deal – Tenders and Negotiations
Contracts for infrastructure development are awarded through tenders, negotiations, or a combination
of the two. These pre-project activities can require great expenditure of time and resources. During
these phases, expectations begin to be developed that may later be met, or frustrated. And when it is
the latter, disputes can arise. Not surprisingly, a number of investment arbitrations have dealt with this
pre-deal phase, pronouncing on the circumstances under which states can be liable for deals that do
not materialize, and to would-be partners who are not selected for a particular project. Additionally,
cases have addressed circumstances in which conduct by a state or state entity during the tender and
negotiation phase may later come back to haunt the government when the deal does not go as the
investor had expected.
In essence, as is illustrated in more detail below, these disputes reveal notable differences in the
degrees of scrutiny tribunals will apply to a host state’s laws and conduct – a factor impacting liability
that is difficult to control and even more difficult to correct given limited avenues for review of
arbitral awards. Additionally, the disputes suggest a need for governments to be careful not to
overpromise and to clearly communicate disclaimers, reservations, reasoning and stances. Following
these guidelines in practice, however, may be difficult and resource-intensive, and can potentially put
governments at a disadvantage when trying to negotiate deals.
The six disputes examined in this section have arisen out of tenders and negotiations where the
foreign investor seeks relief for its denied applications or failed projects: Lemire v. Ukraine148 (tenders
for radio frequencies); Parkerings v. Lithuania149 (tender for development and operation of parking
infrastructure and operations); F-W Oil v. Trinidad and Tobago150 (tenders and negotiations for a
contract to develop offshore oil resources); PSEG v. Turkey151 (negotiations for development of a mine
and electricity generation project); and Nordzucker v. Poland152 (negotiations for purchase of stateowned companies through privatization process); Mihaly v. Sri Lanka153 (negotiations for development
of power plant).
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A. Liability for Rejected Bids
Two cases involving claims for state liability arising out of rejected bids or proposals are Lemire and
Parkerings. They illustrate both that foreign individuals and entities can use investment treaties to
contest adverse decisions; and that, although outcomes are difficult to predict, tribunals seem to want
some showing that the government had legitimate reasons for its decisions.
Lemire involved the claims of a US investor that had established a company in Ukraine in the mid1990s to invest in that country’s recently privatized radio broadcasting industry. According to Lemire,
he had discussed his business plans with members of the government entity responsible for granting
broadcasting licenses and those members, in turn, had encouraged his efforts. After successfully
obtaining some radio frequencies early in his operations, Lemire contended that from 1999 through
2008 the Ukrainian government frustrated his “legitimate expectations” by repeatedly and improperly
rejecting his roughly 200 applications to acquire additional broadcasting licenses and develop several
nationwide radio networks. Lemire asserted that the manner in which the government ran its tenders
and its decisions to award licenses to other bidders violated the FET obligation in the investment treaty
between the United States and Ukraine.
Notably, although Lemire could have pursued domestic remedies to challenge the tender decisions,
and had previously successfully brought other claims against the government before Ukrainian courts,
he chose not to pursue that path to contest the allegedly wrongful tender processes and decisions,
deciding instead to challenge the government’s administrative conduct through arbitration under the
treaty.154 The relevant remedies offered by the two different litigation strategies seem to have
influenced that strategic choice: under domestic law, the remedy for an improper tender would be the
set aside of the tender decision and a repeat of the tender process under which the claimant would
presumably have had no greater chance of success; under the treaty however, the claimant could and
did seek compensation including the future lost profits he expected to receive had he had obtained his
sought-after licenses.155
In its defense, the government asserted that the state entity responsible for the tender processes
justifiably awarded frequencies to other applicants. The government explained that Lemire’s company
lacked the necessary resources and capabilities to prevail in its applications, and that other bidders
were more qualified. It noted that in one of the bids Lemire claimed to have wrongfully lost, his
company had not even participated in the tender. Additionally, according to Ukraine, even if the tender
processes suffered from some irregularities, Lemire could not establish he would have been successful
in his applications “but for” those problems.
The majority of the arbitrators sided with Lemire on his FET claim. Looking first to the meaning of
the FET obligation, they determined it represented a heightened “autonomous” standard that
guaranteed foreign investors better treatment than they were entitled to under customary international
law.156
Applying that standard, the tribunal concluded that the tender process was irregular, arbitrary, and
discriminatory, and ultimately frustrated Lemire’s “undoubtedly … legitimate expectations” that he
would be able to expand his investment in Ukraine’s broadcasting industry (even though he had no
formal business plan detailing that aim).157 Three key factors appeared to lead the tribunal to its
conclusion: first was its view that the processes were “tainted by interferences from other political
organs of [the state], including the President of Ukraine;”158 second was the fact that the government
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entity running the bids did not record or publish its evaluation of required criteria or the reasons for its
decisions (nor was it required to do so under the law), preventing it from countering Lemire’s
arguments that the decision-making was improper;159 and third was the absence of any requirement in
law, regulation or practice for companies bidding for tenders to disclose their ultimate and beneficial
owners – a factor that, according to the tribunal, “clearly represent[ed] a shortcoming of the
system”.160 The tribunal concluded that “[w]hile none of the above features alone stigmatizes the
entire process as arbitrary, there is a risk that the shortcomings may end up mutually reinforcing each
other.”161
Overall, the decision in Lemire reflects heavy scrutiny of Ukraine’s laws, regulations and practices,
and little deference to administrative processes or decisions. Additionally, by taking a “totality of the
circumstances” approach, the tribunal was able to find against the state even though no individual act,
omission, or procedural shortcoming, standing alone, would have necessarily supported liability. This
approach favors investors as it broadens the grounds on which they can mount successful claims.
Ukraine subsequently sought annulment of the award; but in a decision that is not publicly available,
the ICSID ad hoc annulment committee rejected that request and allowed the award to stand.162
Like the claimant in Lemire, the claimant in Parkerings sought relief for, inter alia, its rejected
investment efforts. In Parkerings, the claimant alleged that the government’s decision to reject its
plans to construct a parking facility in the historic center of Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius, and to select a
competing bid from another foreign investor, breached the treaty’s MFN obligation. The tribunal
found otherwise, concluding that the specific features of the two competing projects, and the public
opposition to the claimant’s proposal in particular, supported the government’s decision not to accept
the project. The tribunal reasoned:
[D]espite similarities in objective and venue, the Tribunal has concluded, on balance, that the
differences of size of Pinus Proprius and BP’s projects, as well as the significant extension of the
latter into the Old Town near the Cathedral area, are important enough to determine that the two
investors were not in like circumstances. Furthermore, the Municipality of Vilnius was faced with
numerous and solid oppositions from various bodies that relied on archaeological and
environmental concerns. In the record, nothing convincing would show that such concerns were
not determinant or were built up to reject BP’s project. Thus the City of Vilnius did have
legitimate grounds to distinguish between the two projects. Indeed, the refusal by the Municipality
of Vilnius to authorize BP’s project in Gedimino was justified by various concerns, especially in
terms of historical and archaeological preservation and environmental protection. These concerns
are peculiar to the extension of BP’s project in the Old Town and thus could justify different
treatment with Pinus Proprius. In the absence of convincing evidence that Pinus Proprius benefited
from a more favourable treatment in terms of administrative requirement, the Arbitral Tribunal
finds that the Claimant failed to demonstrate a discrimination concerning the Gedimino car
163
park.

For liability to attach, the tribunal thus required the claimant to provide convincing evidence that the
city’s concerns regarding and in opposition to its proposed project were pretextual and that the other
project was not subject to the same administrative requirements. Its decision in favor of the
government thus seems to reflect a deference to the government that is not present in Lemire: In
Parkerings, the claimant clearly had the burden of proving that the rationale behind and outcome of
the government’s decisions were wrongful, while in Lemire the tribunal’s decision on liability seemed
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to hinge in significant part on the government’s failure to record and inability to adequately establish
the reasoning for its decisions. The cases thus illustrate that foreign investors can use investment
treaties as an alternative or additional avenue through which to challenge failed bids or tenders, but
also highlight the difficulty in assessing, ex ante, what type of conduct will give rise to liability and
what proof is necessary to establish breach.
B. Liability for Failed Negotiations
Several cases address circumstances in which bilateral negotiations for public-private infrastructure
(and other projects) have collapsed. One example of the circumstances in which this breakdown has
led to state liability under an investment treaty is the dispute in PSEG v. Turkey.
In 1994, the Turkish parliament passed a law allowing the government to enter into private law
contracts for the development of power projects; under this private law model, the power project
contracts could include provisions providing for dispute settlement in international arbitration. The
contracts could also be entered into without the need for approval by the Turkish Council of State (the
“Danistay”) that had traditionally been required for concession contracts.
After passage of that new law, PSEG proposed a mining and power plant project to the Turkish
Ministry of Mines and, in 1995, secured government approval of its feasibility study. Prior to
conclusion of any contract for that project, however, the Turkish Constitutional Court ruled that power
projects such as the one proposed by PSEG could not fall under the private law framework, but had to
follow the traditional concession contract model and be approved by the Danistay.
The government of Turkey and PSEG subsequently concluded an “Implementation Contract” based
on the feasibility study and submitted it for approval to the Danistay in 1996. Nevertheless, while that
review and approval process was pending, PSEG was simultaneously seeking changes to the economic
terms of the Implementation Contract and feasibility study based on a revised mining plan that it had
developed. More specifically, PSEG’s updated mining plan reflected higher costs for the mine than
had previously been anticipated and PSEG proposed that those costs would be met by increasing the
amount of electricity the project would generate and the amount the government would be obligated to
buy. Additionally, PSEG proposed structuring the investment through a different corporate vehicle,
with the new approach designed to free it from having to pay over USD 250 million in taxes to Turkey
over the life of the project.
In March 1998, the Danistay signed off on the Implementation Contract, approving it as a
Concession Contract that largely incorporated the economics and other plans envisaged in the
Implementation Contract and feasibility study, but striking out a clause providing for ICSID
arbitration of disputes. But that approval did enable the project to move ahead as the parties had still
not reached agreement on the new terms needed by PSEG in light of the revised mine plan. Key
elements of the project such as the plant’s generating capacity, the required government take, the
company’s corporate form, and appropriate tariffs, all remained unsettled.
Ultimately, the situation appears to have become intractable, with the parties unable to agree on
terms acceptable to either side. A few final triggers seem to have exacerbated disagreements and
brought the collapse of the negotiations. First, after the tax law was changed to remove the roughly
USD 250 million tax burden associated with incorporation in Turkey, PSEG nevertheless continued to
demand compensation for those alleged tax payments even though it no longer had to make them.
Second, when, in January 2000, Turkish law was changed to allow parties to apply for permission to
convert concession contracts to private law contracts allowing arbitration, the Ministry of Mines
indicated it would only allow PSEG to seek that change if a number of other modifications to the
contract were made. Third, changes in domestic law and policy regarding government support of
power projects caused the government to back away from issuing a previously contemplated – but not
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yet concluded – treasury guarantee that could have resulted in Turkey taking on significant potential
costs and liabilities.
After the negotiations collapsed, PSEG initiated arbitration, seeking as damages amounts invested
and lost future profits from the project.
The tribunal sided with PSEG on its claim that Turkey’s conduct violated the FET standard. In
doing so, it announced a standard that gives broad pre-contractual rights to investors while
correspondingly imposing on states significant pre-contractual obligations.
246. The Tribunal is persuaded …that the fair and equitable treatment standard has been breached,
and that this breach is serious enough as to attract liability. Short of bad faith, there is in the
present case first an evident negligence on the part of the administration in the handling of the
negotiations with the Claimants. The fact that key points of disagreement went unanswered and
were not disclosed in a timely manner, that silence was kept when there was evidence of such
persisting and aggravating disagreement, that important communications were never looked at,
and that there was a systematic attitude not to address the need to put an end to negotiations that
were leading nowhere, are all manifestations of serious administrative negligence and
inconsistency. The Claimants were indeed entitled to expect that the negotiations would be
handled competently and professionally, as they were on occasion.
247. Secondly, there is a breach of the obligation to accord fair and equitable standard of treatment
in light of abuse of authority, evidenced in particular, but not exclusively, by the discussion of
[PSEG’s application to convert the contract to a private law contract]. As noted above, [the
government’s] demands for a renegotiation went far beyond the purpose of the Law and attempted
to reopen aspects of the Contract that were not at issue in this context or even within [the
government’s] authority.
248. Inconsistent administrative acts are also evident in this case in respect of some matters. … A
witness for the Claimants testified that since 1996 “the various groups determining energy policy
in Turkey have not worked harmoniously.”
…
250. Thirdly, the Tribunal also finds that the fair and equitable treatment obligation was seriously
breached by what has been described above as the “roller-coaster” effect of the continuing
legislative changes. This is particularly the case of the requirements relating, in law or practice, to
the continuous change in the conditions governing the corporate status of the Project, and the
constant alternation between private law status and administrative concessions that went back and
forth. This was also the case, to a more limited extent, of the changes in tax legislation.
…
254… Stability cannot exist in a situation where the law kept changing continuously and
endlessly, as did its interpretation and implementation. While in complex negotiations, such as
those involved in this case, many changes will occur beyond the control of the government, as was
particularly the case with the increased costs, the issue is that the longer term outlook must not be
altered in such a way that will end up being no outlook at all. In this case, it was not only the law
164
that kept changing but notably the attitudes and policies of the administration.

The tribunal’s decision thus imposed treaty liability on Turkey for “negligent” or inattentive conduct
during contract negotiations, and for changes in background law impacting a contract even before the
essential terms of that contract had been agreed. The PSEG decision instructs that governments may
be penalized for letting negotiations drag on when they are ambivalent about projects, and that they
might also be found to breach their treaty obligations by shifting policies that cause them to walk away
from deals even though those deals had yet to crystallize.
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C. Requirements for Vesting and Enforceability
As the Lemire and PSEG show, tribunals have been sympathetic to investors’ claims that they have
expended considerable resources participating in negotiations and tenders that ultimately fail to
produce a contract or project. Yet despite similarly holding such sympathies, other tribunals have
declined to find pre-contract and pre-project expenditures constitute “investments”, particularly when
the government has made clear its intent not to be legally bound by or owe any obligations as a result
of those preliminary steps.
The tribunal in Mihaly v. Sri Lanka is an example, finding that the claimant had not made an
“investment” within the meaning of the investment treaty or ICSID Convention even though it had
made significant, but ultimately unsuccessful, efforts to develop a power plant in Sri Lanka. The
tribunal explained that the scope of the claimant’s rights were clearly limited:
47.Ultimately, there was never any contract entered into between the Claimant and the Respondent
for the building, ownership and operation of the power station.
48. It is in this factual setting that the Tribunal has been asked to consider whether or not, the
undoubted expenditure of money, following upon the execution of the Letter of Intent, in pursuit
of the ultimately failed enterprise to obtain a contract, constituted “investment” for the purpose of
the Convention. The Tribunal has not been asked to and cannot consider in a vacuum whether or
not in other circumstances expenditure of moneys might constitute an “investment”. A crucial and
essential feature of what occurred between the Claimant and the Respondent in this case was that
first, the Respondent took great care in the documentation relied upon by the Claimant to point out
that none of the documents, in conferring exclusivity upon the Claimant, created a contractual
obligation for the building, ownership and operation of the power station. Second, the grant of
exclusivity never matured into a contract. To put it rhetorically, what else could the Respondent
have said to exclude any obligations which might otherwise have attached to interpret the
expenditure of the moneys as an admitted investment? The operation of SAEC was contingent
upon the final conclusion of the contract with Sri Lanka, thus the expenditures for its creation
would not be regarded as an investment until admitted by Sri Lanka.
…
51. It is an undoubted feature of modern day commercial activity that huge sums of money may
need to be expended in the process of preparing the stage for a final contract. However, the
question whether an expenditure constitutes an investment or not is hardly to be governed by
whether or not the expenditure is large or small. Ultimately, it is always a matter for the parties to
determine at what point in their negotiations they wish to engage the provisions of the Convention
by entering into an investment. Specifically, the Parties could have agreed that the formation of a
South Asia Electricity Company was to be treated as the starting point of the admitted investment,
engaging the responsibility of the Respondent for the Claimant’s failure to complete other
arrangements to achieve the milestones by the due date mentioned in the Letter of Extension. The
facts of the case point to the opposite conclusion. The Respondent clearly signaled, in the various
documents which are relied upon by the Claimant, that it was not until the execution of a contract
that it was willing to accept that contractual relations had been entered into and that an investment
165
had been made….

To the tribunal, the fact that Sri Lanka had expressly disclaimed any legal obligations arising out of
contract negotiations was key. Sri Lanka had entered into a Letter of Intent, Letter of Agreement, and
Letter of Extension with the claimant; and, although each of those instruments affirmed the parties’
commitments to develop the project, each document also plainly stated that it did not create
obligations binding on either party. Based on those facts, the tribunal stated:
59. The Tribunal concludes in regard to the three Letters of Intent, of Agreement and of Extension
successively issued by and on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka in the course of 1993 and
1994 that none of these Letters contains any binding obligation either on Sri Lanka or on the

165

Mihaly v. Sri Lanka, paras. 47-51.

36

The Impact of Investment Treaties on Governance of Private Investment in Infrastructure

Claimant. As the Tribunal has already stated, in the circumstances of this case, they are not to be
treated in any way as signifying acceptance by the host State, Sri Lanka, of such expenditures as
constituting an investment within the sense of the Convention. There is no evidence which could
contradict the contingent and non-binding character of the three Letters of Intent, of Agreement
and of Extension.
60. The Tribunal is of the view that de lege ferenda the sources of international law on the
extended meaning or definition of investment will have to be found in conventional law or in
customary law. The Claimant has not succeeded in furnishing any evidence of treaty interpretation
or practice of States, let alone that of developing countries or Sri Lanka for that matter, to the
effect that pre-investment and development expenditures in the circumstances of the present case
could automatically be admitted as “investment” in the absence of the consent of the host State to
the implementation of the project. It should be observed that while the US-Sri Lanka BIT contains
provisions regarding the definition of investment and conditions for its admission, they recognize
166
the Parties’ prerogative in this respect.

A similar outcome to Mihaly v. Sri Lanka can be seen in F-W Oil v. Trinidad and Tobago. There, the
claimant likewise initiated the investment arbitration in order to challenge dashed expectations from a
deal that never materialized. Its claims failed as the tribunal scrutinized the enforceable rights and
expectations the claimant actually held regarding the potential project.
F-W Oil had been selected as the winning bidder in a tender for a service contract to develop
offshore oil resources. After being awarded the tender, it entered into negotiations with the stateowned oil company, Trinmar, to conclude the deal. Roughly five months after awarding F-W Oil the
tender, Trinmar notified F-W Oil that it was withdrawing from the negotiations. Trinmar later
launched a new bidding process in which F-W Oil declined to participate (and which was later
aborted). The disappointed company sought relief under the investment treaty between the United
States and Trinidad and Tobago, asking for a return of sunk costs and payment of lost future profits.
According to the claimant, it had several protected “investments” under the treaty’s wide definition
of the term. In particular, the claimant argued that it had made investments under the investment treaty
and ICSID Convention through its investment of time, money and expertise in the tender process and
during the negotiations; its alleged contractual rights arising under local law as a result of the tender
process; and its contribution of intellectual property to the project.167 The tribunal rejected all of those
claims and, in doing so, gave some guidance to states on how they might similarly be able to avoid
liability.
Importantly, the tribunal’s reading of the term “investment” led it to conclude that the treaty only
covered rights held under domestic law, and not merely expectations or interests:
[T]he notion of an “investment” …, the axis around which the operation of the BIT revolves, can
only realistically be understood as referring to something in the nature of a legal right or
entitlement. This appears clearly enough from the extensively itemized definition of “investment”
in Article 1(d) quoted above, each item in which is either a form of property or is expressed as a
“right”. It is admittedly the case that the definition given in Article 1(d) is on its own terms not
exhaustive; it is expressed merely to ‘include’ the forms of investment itemized on the list. The
common thread is nevertheless so strong that the Tribunal is unable to conclude that the intention
can have been to bring within the scope of the term claims other than those based on proprietary or
contractual rights, which, in the Tribunal’s view, corresponds in any event to the whole underlying
notion of an “investment”. Further weighty support for this interpretation of the BIT can be drawn
from Articles II, III, IV & V, which lay down the main substantive protections to be accorded by
each part to “covered investments”, such as national and most-favoured-nation treatment, fair and
equitable treatment, full protection and security, protection against arbitrary expropriation,
freedom to make transfers, and so forth. It would be difficult, or even impossible, to apply these
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standards in any meaningful way to claims falling short of actual proprietary or contractual
168
rights.

Looking first at whether the investor’s pre-contract expenditures constituted investments, the tribunal
stated that if rights to recover such costs existed, the claim would need to exist under the law of
Trinidad and Tobago. There would be no “valid claim under the BIT without a showing that the
domestic-law right of action qualifies as an “investment.”169
This approach – which relies on domestic law (including its contract law) to define the scope of
rights protected as “investments” under the treaty, appears narrower than that of other tribunals that
emphasize the need to protect investors’ “expectations” from interference even if they would not have
qualified as vested and enforceable rights under applicable domestic law.170
The tribunal concluded that there were “insurmountable” hurdles to the claimant’s case on precontract expenditures. Namely, the terms of the bid provided that Trinmar, the state-owned company,
would not be responsible for costs or expenses incurred by bidders in connection with the preparation,
submission and presentation of bid proposals. In the letter awarding the tender, Trinmar had stated the
“award was made subject to the negotiation and execution of a mutually agreeable operating
agreement.”171 And, after it was awarded the tender, F-W Oil had unsuccessfully requested a
liquidated damages clause under which it could be paid a sum of not more than $10 million if the
parties failed to reach a final agreement. Trinmar responded to that request by expressly disclaiming
liability for “any costs or expenditures incurred by F-W Oil Interests prior to the execution of a
contract on this tender.”172 The tribunal concluded that these facts left
no room for the law to imply a right of repayment, which was expressly requested and expressly
refused. As in the normal tendering situation FWO undertook the expenditure at its own risk….In
these circumstances we reject the proposition that FWO had a legally enforceable claim for
reimbursement under the law of Trinidad and Tobago. By the same token we are unable to agree
that FWO’s preparatory expenditure constituted an “investment” for the purposes of the BIT or the
173
[ICSID] Convention.

Second, the tribunal assessed whether F-W Oil had an “investment” due to its alleged contractual right
to have Trinmar negotiate in good faith to conclude an agreement after F-W Oil had won the tender.174
It reasoned that it was “far from clear that an intermediate obligation of the nature presupposed, being
concerned only with negotiating methods and not substantive rights, could rank as an ‘investment’ for
the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on the present Tribunal.”175 In other words, even if F-W Oil had
a contractual right to have Trinmar negotiate in good faith, that did not constitute an “investment”
under the treaty.
Finally, the tribunal similarly rejected F-W Oil’s arguments that it had an “investment” through the
intellectual property (e.g., confidential plans and economic models) it had developed and submitted in
connection with its tender offer, and that that investment was later appropriated by the government to
use as its second tender. It stated that F-W Oil’s pre-contract plans and models did not constitute
investments; moreover, the tribunal added, the claimant provided no evidence that it had suffered any
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specific loss as a result of any alleged misappropriation of that intellectual property by the
government.176
D. Damages for Failed Negotiations and Tenders
Once a tribunal finds a government is liable for pre-project conduct, it then moves into an assessment
of damages. In Lemire, the tribunal awarded Lemire nearly USD 9 million in compensation and costs,
plus interest. This tribunal determined that this amount included the funds Lemire’s company would
have earned if Ukraine’s tender procedures had not been characterized by shortcomings and Lemire
had been able to secure his licenses and proceed with the plans he had when he invested in the country
in 1995.
One of the arbitrators in Lemire, however, dissented, taking issue with various aspects of the
majority’s ruling including its decision to award lost future profits. On the issue of damages, he argued
that if any were awarded, they should have been limited to the amount expended during the bid
processes, a measure of compensation applied in Ukraine and other domestic jurisdictions.
In PSEG, as compensation for breach of the failed negotiations, and over respondent’s objection that
no compensation was due because no ground had been broken for the mine nor construction started on
the power plant, the tribunal ordered the government to compensate the investor for costs expended
from the submission of its feasibility study through continued negotiations in the effort to develop the
project. All expenses were entirely pre-construction, many pre-Implementation Contract, and many
were also prior to the Dinastay’s approval of the Concession Contract. In all, the tribunal declared that
Turkey had to pay PSEG USD 9 million plus interest, and bear 65% of the roughly USD 21 million in
arbitration costs.
Nordzucker AG v. Poland177 reflects a different approach. The case shares some features with
PSEG and Lemire in granting the investor pre-contract protections. In particular, the tribunal stated
that the government did not treat the claimant fairly and equitably by failing to diligently manage a
privatization process and being insufficiently transparent in negotiations with an investor over roughly
the last six months of a year-long attempt by the investor to purchase government assets. According to
the tribunal, the government should have been clearer with the investor when its views about the sale
shifted: it should have better communicated to the investor that the price the investor had offered was
too low, and that political opposition to the privatization (particularly at the sale price being
contemplated) prevented the government from accepting the investor’s proposal.
In contrast to PSEG and Lemire, however, the Nordzucker tribunal appeared to take a stricter
approach to awarding compensation. In its decision on damages, Nordzucker tribunal rejected the
claimant’s claims for both future lost profits and for costs expended in unsuccessfully pursuing the
deal. On the first issue, claimant failed to establish that it would have been able to close the deal had
the government complied with its treaty obligations and been more transparent about its position. The
tribunal emphasized that the government had broad rights under the law to reject proposed transactions
and did not have to give reasons for its decisions to approve or deny deals. Instead of reviewing the
government’s decision and analyzing who should have been awarded the contract through an open and
adequate process, the tribunal focused on the fact that the government’s ability to reject any
transaction under the law meant that the claimant had no right to the assets and could not recover for
that lost opportunity.
On the second issue, the tribunal stated that the claimant failed to adequately indicate what costs
and losses it specifically incurred over the roughly six months that the negotiations were unduly
prolonged by the government’s negligent and non-transparent conduct. Accordingly, the tribunal did
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not order the government of Poland to pay the investor any compensation, and did require the investor
to reimburse Poland for the government’s costs in having to respond to the claimant’s claims for “lost
opportunity” damages.
Together, these cases illustrate that tribunals do not view themselves as being limited in terms of
the damages they can order for failed negotiations and tenders. In addition to awarding compensation
for expenses incurred when participating in wrongfully conducted processes, tribunals also appear
open to issuing awards to of lost profits for failed negotiations and tenders, though they take different
approaches regarding what they will require of claimants in order to successfully recover those
damages. Importantly, this opens up a road for damages that at least some authorities indicate goes
beyond what is and should be permitted under domestic systems. The Legislative Guide for Privately
Financed Infrastructure developed by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), for instance, describes a different approach. It notes that establishing a mechanism for
review of tender procedures and awards constitutes best practice, and different legal systems have
developed a variety of mechanisms and processes through which to facilitate that review including
judicial or administrative review, or judicial review after opportunities of administrative relief had
been exhausted. On the issue of appropriate damages, it states:
Except where a project agreement was the result of unlawful acts, a good solution is that a
judgement should not render the project agreement void, but award damages to the injured party. It
is usually agreed that such damages should not include loss of profits, but be limited to the cost
178
incurred by the bidder in preparing the bid.

UNCITRAL’s recommendation highlights that tribunals’ decisions on damages in investor-state cases
do not necessarily correspond with common or recommended domestic practices for how to
compensate potential investors and/or sanction government actors for flawed negotiating and tender
procedures. Absent language in the relevant treaty instructing tribunals what types of relief may and
may not be awarded, the system of treaty-based investor-state arbitration makes it extremely difficult
for states to prevent these types of damages being ordered in a case or to challenge them subsequently.
E. The Role of Treaty Language - Pre- and Post- Establishment Agreements
The majority of treaties only govern states’ treatment of established investments. Only a minority goes
beyond that and expressly covers the establishment, acquisition and expansion of investments by
foreign investors. Even those, however, tend to only apply the establishment/acquisition/expansion
protections to certain treaty obligations, namely the non-discrimination obligations and the restrictions
on performance requirements. The FET obligation and provisions on expropriation generally are
solely directed at covered “investments”, signaling that the treaty parties did not intend them to extend
to pre-establishment or expansion phases.179
Yet the fact that treaties are largely restricted to providing post-establishment coverage and
protections, has not proven a barrier to claims relating to pre-project activities and expenditures. This
section briefly discusses how the underlying treaty’s approach to pre-establishment and post178
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establishment protections has impacted tribunals’ decisions on liability for failed tenders and
negotiations.
The underlying treaty at issue in Mihaly v. Sri Lanka (the United States-Sri Lanka BIT) is an
example of an agreement that does contain some pre-establishment protections. It requires host states
to “permit” investment and associated activities (including the making of contracts and acquisition of
property) in accordance with national treatment and MFN treatment, and also prevents either party
from “impair[ing] by arbitrary and discriminatory measures” the “acquisition” and “expansion” of
investments.180 Nevertheless, according to the tribunal in the Mihaly v. Sri Lanka dispute, there was
insufficient evidence that the state parties had intended to define expenditures incurred in preparing for
and developing projects as covered “investments” or provide substantive rights and protections
relating to those expenditures. The tribunal emphasized that the treaty recognized the parties’
prerogatives regarding admission of investment, and that the treaty limited FET protection to
investments “in being”.181 Thus, the tribunal reasoned, absent the host state’s consent to implement a
project, it would be premature to allow an investor to seek recovery of project-related costs by
claiming they constituted an “investment.”182 The claimant’s “unilateral or internal characterization”
of its expenditures and expectations was unable to change that conclusion.183
The Mihaly decision thus seems to place weight on the traditional ability of states to control
admission of foreign investment, and evidences reluctance to chip away at states’ sovereign authority
to control the projects it will permit and implement absent clear indication that that is consistent with
the treaty parties’ intent.
Lemire and PSEG reflect a different approach, though the treaties at issue in those disputes contain
language very similar to that in Mihaly v. Sri Lanka. More specifically, in Lemire and PSEG, the
tribunals allowed the investors to use a broad asset-based definition of covered “investments” as a
hook to cover a basic property right or interest (a framework contract in PSEG and a shareholding in a
radio company in Lemire), and then relied on the FET standard to protect the investors’ expectations
regarding future development of those assets. Pursuant to this approach, the line between pre- and
post-establishment treaties becomes particularly blurred as it would seem to allow an investor to use a
variety of assets (e.g., permits, local affiliates, and preliminary agreements) as based upon which to
bring claims and seek relief for projects and activities that did not materialize as planned.
Nordzucker v. Poland takes a different approach to identifying whether treaties are limited to postestablishment protections and assessing whether an investment is pre- or post-establishment. As the
tribunal noted, the relevant treaty in that dispute barred its state parties from “imped[ing] the
management, maintenance, use or enjoyment of investments in its territory … by means of unjustified
or discriminatory measures.”184 The treaty did not bar such conduct when applied to or impeding the
establishment, acquisition, or expansion of investment.185 Moreover, with respect to the obligations to
admit foreign investment, the treaty provided that each contracting party was required to allow such
investment in accordance with its own laws, indicating that each state party retained significant preestablishment leeway to determine when, whether, and under what conditions to allow foreign
investment. The tribunal recognized the policy rationale behind those limits, particularly in the context
of tender processes:
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Taking into account the fact that tenders open for privatization State’s assets (shares, business, real
estate etc.) attract usually a large number of foreign bidders only one of whom can be successful,
the State would be exposed to many international arbitration proceedings commenced by
unsuccessful bidders. For this reason the States in principle … agree to grant the full Treaty
protection only with regard to investments actually made and admitted in accordance with the law
186
of the host State and not to intended investments.

Yet recognizing those issues, the tribunal reasoned that while not every bidder would be entitled to
benefit from all treaty protections, some bidders might be covered under certain standards if they had
adequately advanced in their efforts to invest. Based on the treaty and facts before it, the tribunal
determined that the tender and subsequent negotiations had proceeded between the claimant and the
government to such an extent that, even though Nordzucker had not secured any formal contract
rights, it should be deemed to have “investments in the making” that were entitled to be covered by the
obligation to “promote” and “admit” investments by foreign investors and the obligation to accord
foreign investments fair and equitable treatment.187
Nordzucker thus takes a relatively permissive approach to allowing claims based on pre-project
activities. Indeed, it even appears to go beyond the holdings in Lemire and PSEG by suggesting that
there need not even be a basic asset to serve as the “hook” on which to bring in claims based on
expectations for future development and expansion. Rather, and in contrast to Mihaly, it is the extent
of activity and engagement that counts.

VI. Establishing Linkages as a Condition of Market Access
When identifying contracting parties for major investments such as infrastructure projects, and when
defining the ideal features of those projects, governments often seek to identify ways to best ensure
those investors and investments provide positive spillovers in the host economies through developing
linkages with suppliers and consumers, transferring technology, hiring local workers, investing in
research and development and education and training, and making their investment in a particular
location.
While developed and developing countries have used various types of conditions and “performance
requirements” to accomplish these aims, there is a growing number of investment treaties that prevent
use of those policy tools. This section provides a brief overview of these aspects of investment treaties
as they are increasingly relevant to the terms of a government can ask for, secure, and subsequently
enforce in a deal.
A. Pre-Establishment National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment
One main limitation on placing conditions on investments comes from the non-discrimination
obligations (i.e., national and most-favoured nation treatment). As noted above, these obligations
require host countries to treat covered foreign investors no less favourably than investors from third
countries or their own domestic investors. Many treaties only impose these requirements on
established investments, meaning that (unless they have committed otherwise in a trade agreement
such as the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement in Trade in Services (GATS)), states
retain the ability to bar, restrict, or impose conditions on foreign investment in infrastructure and other
assets, enterprises or activities.
Yet as noted above, some agreements (whose numbers appear to be growing) expand the nondiscrimination obligation to the “pre-establishment” and expansion phases. The investment treaty
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between Canada and Peru, for instance, provides that host states must accord national treatment and
MFN treatment regarding the “establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation
and sale or other disposition of investments” by investors of the other state party.188
This means that covered foreign investors must be given the same rights and conditions of market
access as other foreign investors, or even domestic investors. Through these provisions, states can lose
the ability to limit, control, or condition foreign participation in sensitive infrastructure developments,
public services, or other investments, even if the aim behind those measures is to try to serve
legitimate policy goals such as ensuring regulatory control over the project company or deepening
linkages between the foreign investor and the host economy. Requirements to invest through joint
ventures or other corporate forms, mandates to have a certain percentage of domestic equity, and
obligations to hire or source locally are among those types of requirements or conditions that, if not
imposed on foreign and domestic investors alike, can violate non-discrimination obligations.
In contrast to the GATS, where only those sectors that are specifically listed are covered by the
treaty’s national treatment obligation (i.e., the “positive list” approach), a number of investment
treaties cover all investments in all sectors unless and only to the extent that they are specifically
excluded (i.e., the “negative list” approach). This can have the effect of widening the types of
economic activities covered by pre-establishment national treatment rules.
Importantly, even if a particular investment treaty only imposes rules on a host state that are
substantively the same as, but do not go beyond, the state’s commitments under the GATS, investment
treaties may, in practice, impose stronger obligations than that treaty. This is because the GATS and
other regional or bilateral agreements like it that specifically govern international trade in services
generally only allow claims of breach to be resolved through state-to-state mechanisms. Investment
treaties, in contrast, allow investors to assert their own rights. They are therefore empowered to
directly challenge conditions on bids or proposals that discriminate against foreign investors.
B. Restrictions on Performance Requirements
Another increasingly common set of provisions in investment treaties relates to, and restricts, use of
“performance requirements” on investment projects. While countries that are party to the WTO
already are bound by some restrictions on their use of performance requirements, a growing number of
investment treaties imposes added constraints on governments’ abilities to employ these tools.
More specifically, members of the WTO are bound by the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs Agreement) that limits certain performance requirements relating to trade in goods,
such as (1) requirements to use or purchase local goods; (2) trade-balancing requirements; (3) foreign
exchange restrictions related to the foreign-exchange inflows attributable to an enterprise; and (4)
export controls.
The TRIMs Agreement, however, left many types of performance requirements untouched. These
include:

188

•

measures relating to trade in services, not goods;

•

requirements to establish a joint venture with domestic participation;

•

requirements for a minimum level of domestic equity participation by domestic individuals or
entities;

•

requirements to locate headquarters in a specific region; local employment requirements;

•

export requirements;

Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May 29, 2008,
Articles 3 and 4.
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•

technology transfer requirements; and

•

research and development requirements.189

Some investment treaties now go farther than the TRIMs Agreement and prohibit or place limits on
governments’ abilities to use some of these measures, including requirements in law or contract to
procure goods or services locally, to require investment in research and development, or to require
technology transfer. Treaties with pre-establishment non-discrimination provisions also restrict
governments’ abilities to impose conditions such as joint venture or domestic equity requirements
through their laws or to require them in contracts.
It may be likely that investors would not want to challenge a government’s efforts to contractually
impose such conditions when negotiating an agreement or making a bid as doing so would likely put
them at a competitive disadvantage as compared to their competitors. But at least some treaties appear
to anticipate this. First, some treaties state that host states are not only prohibited from imposing
performance requirements on investors from the home state, but are prohibited from imposing them on
any foreign investor, attempting to ensure that, irrespective of their respective home countries, all
foreign investors will be on a level playing field. Second, some treaties bar states not only from
imposing performance on foreign investors, but also prevent them from enforcing the requirements.
These types of provisions suggest that even if, for example, a state gets an investor’s commitment to
procure local goods or services in its operations and transfer technology, a state might not be able to
take legal action to secure compliance with those obligations, potentially rendering the commitments
meaningless.
Issues regarding the scope and effect of restrictions on performance requirements have not yet
arisen much in investment-treaty disputes, though that may be changing as those provisions are
becoming more and more common in treaties and as investors and their attorneys learn that there is
legal recourse against these requirements.190
Relevant Exceptions
When treaties contain pre-establishment non-discrimination commitments and restrictions on
performance requirements, they also often include exceptions to those obligations aiming to protect
their ability to regulate certain types of investments or activities, maintain existing policies that would
otherwise breach the obligations, give local and regional governments additional flexibilities, and
further identified policy aims and government practices, such as government procurement. Thus, even
if a treaty covers pre-establishment investments and restricts performance requirements, those rules
may not impact a government’s ability to design a tender or negotiate a contract in the way it chooses
if a relevant exception applies.

VII. The Life of the Deal – Construction and Operation
After the contract has been entered into and performance begins, another host of issues can arise,
many of which have likewise triggered arbitration under investment treaties. This section addresses
how tribunals have addressed such life-of-the-project challenges, and what their decisions may mean
for state parties and their treatment of foreign investors engaged in infrastructure projects. Key issues
covered are: (1) liability for legal and regulatory change; (2) liability for permitting decisions and
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other administrative conduct; (3) liability for intra-deal renegotiations (e.g., normal tariff review
procedures) and extra-deal renegotiations (e.g., requests for changes in contractual service
obligations); and (4) liability for harm caused by conduct of third persons. Throughout the discussion,
this section also covers recurring themes such as the role of domestic law in affecting whether a
government will be liable under the treaty, the relevance of contractual provisions on the parties’
rights and obligations and dispute settlement mechanisms, and the relevance of certain factors such as
the “political” nature of government conduct.
A. Legal and Regulatory Change Impacting Performance
One issue that has been at the center of much controversy regarding investment treaties is the question
of whether and under what circumstances they will give rise to state liability for shifts in the legal and
regulatory environment that impact the profitability of investments.
Traditionally, the rule under international law has been that states would not be liable for changing
their laws in ways that impacted the performance of investor-state contracts (or quasi-contracts such as
permits or licenses) governed by those laws except in two main circumstances: (1) the change was an
abuse of law designed specifically to improperly interfere with the private contracting party’s rights,
or (2) it impacted an investor’s rights under the contract to such an extent that the rights were entirely
extinguished, in which case the rights might be deemed to have been expropriated. Yet decisions
under investment treaties are evidencing a wider range of circumstances in which states will be liable
for legal and regulatory change impacting performance of investor-state contracts in infrastructure and
other investments.
1. An Emerging Approach: Protecting “Commitments”
As discussed above, arbitral tribunals have stated that the “fair and equitable treatment” (FET)
obligation – protects the legitimate expectations of investors formed at the time of making the
investment191 or while it is held,192 and if the legal framework governing the investment changes in a
way that was not anticipated or foreseen by the investor at the time of making the investment, then the
investor should be compensated for the cost of complying with those changes.193 This means that if a
new law is adopted, or an existing law is revoked or interpreted or applied in a new way,194 those
changes can trigger state liability.
Some tribunals have adopted a more lenient approach, stating that investment treaties do not
generally act to freeze the law unless those changes are contrary to a commitment made by the state.195
Under this rule, the scope of state liability for legal or regulatory evolution depends on how a tribunal
defines a contrary “commitment” to the investor.
On this issue, tribunals have taken a range of approaches. Some have required commitments
against regulatory change to be a precise promise by the government in the form of a binding
stabilization clause in a contract between the investor and state. In AES v. Hungary, for instance, the
tribunal rejected the claimant’s argument that the government violated the FET obligation changing
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the legal framework regarding pricing for electricity generation. In doing so, it emphasized that there
was no stabilization clause in the relevant contract guaranteeing the investor that such change would
not be made.196 Under this view, only a specific commitment by a state to an investor promising the
stability of the state’s legal framework would give rise to liability for subsequent changes to that
framework.197
But other tribunals have taken a broader view of what can constitute a commitment against
regulatory change. In Electrabel v. Hungary, for example, the tribunal stated that while “specific
assurances made by the host state” were relevant, they were not “always indispensable.”198 Tribunals
have also determined that the “representations” and “assurances” that can support a promise of
stability include both written and oral statements by government officials,199 and can be implicit as well
as explicit promises.200 Regarding the maker of the promise, tribunals have likewise taken a flexible
approach, and have inferred commitments of stability from statements allegedly made by
representatives of state-owned enterprises during contract negotiations with foreign investors.201
Although some tribunals have stated that such promises must be legally binding in order to
establish an enforceable commitment,202 tribunals have not seemed to strictly apply that rule. In a
number of cases, for example, tribunals have adopted a flexible “totality of the circumstances”
approach when assessing whether such promises have been made, citing a variety of non-binding
statements by public officials in support of their findings that governments have guaranteed regulatory
stability.203 Additionally, tribunals have held that ultra vires contracts or commitments that would be
void ab initio under domestic law can nevertheless be protected and enforced under international
law.204
Notably, in various decisions tribunals have inferred the existence of commitments against legal
change from the simple nature and content of the general legal framework in place at the time the
investor made its investment.205
Regarding the types of changes that can trigger liability, cases indicate that those include actual
changes in the actual laws or regulations as well as changes in the interpretations of those laws or
regulations by reviewing courts or tribunals.206
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In some disputes, tribunals have rested liability for legal change on a breach of the umbrella
clause.207 Yet tribunals also commonly base their findings of liability for regulatory change on a
breach of the FET requirement,208 viewing modifications to the general legal framework as upsetting
investors’ “legitimate expectations” in breach of the guarantees of stability and predictability
enshrined in that standard. This suggests that the FET obligation has evolved in the eyes of at least
some arbitrators to constitute a de facto umbrella clause capable of giving rise to liability for
interference with contractual (and other) commitments.
Overall, these arbitrations suggest that if there is a legally binding investor-state contract for an
infrastructure or other project, the terms of that contract can serve as a “commitment” with which
subsequent legal and regulatory change cannot interfere without violating an investment treaty. But
they also suggest more: namely, that, according to some tribunals, conduct and circumstances external
to the four corners of a legally enforceable contract can also constitute the “commitments” restricting,
or requiring compensation for, such change.
Through this approach, investment treaties provide investors/investments more rights than the
government had formally committed to give or than the investors were able to formally secure
through, for example, negotiating contractual provisions like express stabilization clauses to insulate
them against the cost of complying with certain regulatory changes. These decisions also indicate that
investors can benefit from rights that are more expansive than permitted under relevant domestic law.
It appears, for instance, that tribunals would enforce stabilization clauses even if those clauses would
otherwise be inconsistent with and invalid under a country’s domestic legal framework.
3. Legal Change and other Government Action in the Absence of “Commitments”
Even if there has been no “commitment” against legal or regulatory change, decisions indicate that
shifts in law or policy may nevertheless give rise to liability impacting a foreign investor’s investment
in various circumstances.
Factors that have influenced whether a tribunal will determine that such changes constitute a treaty
breach under the FET obligation have related to both matters of substance and procedure, including:
•
•
•
•

whether the investor should have legitimately expected (even in the absence of any explicit or
implicit promise by the state) that the changes would not occur;209
whether the purpose of the change is legitimate;210
whether the changes appear an arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, or inappropriately tailored way
of meeting their objective;211
whether the government acted in good faith;212
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•
•

the nature of the host state’s legal system and the phases or changes it is or can be expected to go
through;213
the transparency through which the changes were adopted and/or implemented;214

•

whether there is intra-state consistency in policy and action (e.g., whether the national and subnational entities, different federal ministries, or different branches of government are sending the
same signals regarding the change);215 and

•

the ability of the affected investor to know of, comment on, challenge, or participate in the
formulation and adoption of the changes.216

Apart from those FET claims, a change in laws, regulations, or interpretations thereof may be subject
to treaty-based challenges on the ground that it violates other treaty obligations such as the nondiscrimination obligations, the requirement to pay compensation for expropriation, restrictions on
performance requirements, or the umbrella clause.
B. Permitting Decisions and Other Administrative Conduct
The same principles governing liability for legal and regulatory change noted above have also been
relevant in tribunals’ awards addressing challenges to administrative decision-making such as permit
approvals, rejections and modifications and other areas of adjudicatory administrative conduct. In
addition, because tribunals generally hold that investors need not exhaust local remedies before
pursuing treaty claims, this means that investors can use investment treaties to challenge (or threaten
to challenge) a vast set of actions or omissions by lower-level officials even if those investors were
able or required to challenge that conduct through administrative and/or judicial processes.217
On certain issues, one might envision tribunals drawing distinctions between different types of
conduct, recognizing, for instance, that the motives and processes appropriate for an administrative
decision maker will differ from the motives and processes appropriate for rule makers such as
legislators or drafters of regulations, and that those differences are legitimate and should be taken into
account when assessing whether the relevant government actor’s conduct breaches international law.
“Politically” motivated conduct may, for example, be entirely appropriate for a legislator but less so
for an administrative judge. Likewise, the due process required in administrative proceedings may
necessarily and legitimately be entirely different than that required in judicial hearings.218
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To date, however, tribunals do not seem to have engaged in such nuanced analysis of the various
roles and functions of different layers and branches of governments, and, more significantly, the
relevance of those variations for the approach they should take in scrutinizing challenged conduct.219
C. Renegotiations
International contracts – particularly those running over long time horizons – are often renegotiated.
Some of these renegotiations are “intra-deal renegotiations”, meaning that the contract itself provides
that certain parts of the agreement may or will be renegotiated at specified times or in certain
circumstances.220 The renegotiation takes place in accordance with the original contract.221 An
example is a clause requiring a periodic review of tariffs charged for water or electricity, or a clause
providing for an extraordinary review of those tariffs in the event of particular events or
circumstances. These provisions aim to inject flexibility into the deal in order to enable it to survive
over time and under changing circumstances.222
Other renegotiations are “extra-deal renegotiations”:
These negotiations take place “extra-deal,” for they occur outside the framework of the existing
agreement. Forced renegotiation of mineral concession contracts of the 1960s and 1970s,
negotiations to reschedule loans following the Third World debt crisis of the early 1980s, and the
restructuring of infrastructure and financial agreements in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of
the late 1990s all fit within the category of extra-deal renegotiations. In each case, one of the
participants was seeking relief from a legally binding obligation without any basis for
223
renegotiation in the agreement itself.

Each type of renegotiation has figured as an issue in investment disputes, with tribunals’ decisions
having noteworthy implications for states’ conduct in connection with both intra-deal and extra-deal
talks.
1. Intra-Deal Renegotiations
Several cases indicate that, irrespective of what the contract or relevant domestic law provides, treaties
may impose an additional layer of obligations and potential liability on governments relating to their
conduct in pursuing or responding to requests for intra-deal renegotiations.
In PSEG v. Turkey, as noted above, the tribunal signaled that investors are “entitled to expect that
[their] negotiations [will] be handled competently and professionally,” and that there will be a breach
of the FET obligation if those expectations are not met.224 In Saluka v. Czech Republic, the tribunal
stated that the treaty’s FET provision required the state to “take[] seriously a proposal that has
sufficient potential to solve the [relevant] problem and deal with it in an objective, transparent,
unbiased and even-handed way.”225 Citing those two decisions, the tribunal in Frontier Services v.
Czech Republic declared that the requirement of good faith was central to the FET standard and that a
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failure to negotiate in good faith would thus violate the treaty obligation.226 It added that liability could
still attach even if the state were not acting in bad faith. 227
In Teco v. Guatemala, the tribunal stated that a lack of administrative due process in an inter-deal
tariff review processes would violate the FET obligation.228 An administrative body’s failure to
provide reasons supporting its decisions, or to abide by its own procedural rules were factors that the
tribunal viewed as establishing a lack of administrative due process and, consequently, a treaty
breach.229 The tribunal added that the fact that those alleged failings had already been challenged
before Guatemalan courts, that those courts had upheld the legitimacy of the government’s conduct
under Guatemalan law, and that there was no indication or allegation of a denial of justice or
corruption in those judicial proceedings, did not prevent the tribunal from taking jurisdiction over the
dispute and deciding whether the government’s conduct violated international law under the treaty.230
According to the tribunal, it was not bound by the Constitutional Court’s findings that the
government’s actions were consistent with Guatemala’s legal framework governing tariffs.231 It
reasoned that the outcome in the project company’s suit against the regulator under domestic law
could not determine the outcome of the minority shareholder’s suit against Guatemala under the treaty
as the different cases involved different parties and different legal standards.232
Ultimately, the tribunal determined that Guatemala violated the investment treaty when it decided
to rely on one expert report regarding appropriate tariff calculations rather than another expert report,
and did not provide adequate reasons for its choice. The tribunal stated that although the government
regulator was not bound by the report it had opted not to adopt, it nevertheless had the “duty to
seriously consider [the report’s conclusions] and to provide reasons in case it would decide to
disregard them.”233 That procedural obligation to give reasons, the tribunal concluded, was both
implicit in Guatemala’s domestic regulations and an element of administrative due process required
under the MST.234
Some cases indicate that treaty-based obligations to renegotiate are obligations regarding results
binding on the government (as opposed to obligations as to process or efforts). In Impregilo v.
Argentina,235 the tribunal determined that the government breached the FET obligation by not
renegotiating the water and sanitation services concession in order to restore the economic equilibrium
of the contract in response to the economic crisis in the country and the decision by the government to
de-peg the peso from the dollar and establish a floating exchange rate. The tribunal reasoned:
325. The Arbitral Tribunal considers that, once the value of the peso was determined by market
conditions, the balance provided for in Article 12.1.1 [setting forth the principles on which tariffs
236
would be calculated]
no longer existed and that, according to Article 12.1.1, it was then
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incumbent on the Province, in order to treat AGBA in a fair and equitable manner, to find
appropriate solutions to restore the envisaged balance. In other words, since the new exchange rate
caused by the abolition of the fixed legal rate had highly detrimental effects on AGBA, the
Province should have offered AGBA a reasonable adjustment of its obligations under the
Concession Contract.
326. Indeed, it appears that the Emergency Law also envisaged a renegotiation of public utilities
agreements to adapt them to the new exchange system. This would have been a basis for finding a
new equilibrium between the Parties to the Concession Agreement and for ensuring that Impregilo,
as shareholder in AGBA, was granted fair and equitable treatment.
…
330. Since the disturbance of the equilibrium between rights and obligations in the concession was
essentially due to measures taken by the Argentine legislator [in establishing the floating exchange
rate and regulating water and sewerage services], it must have been incumbent on Argentina to act
to effectively restore an equilibrium on a new or modified basis. Although Argentina has attributed
the failure of the negotiations to what it regarded as AGBA’s unreasonable demands, it does not
appear that Argentina took any measures to create for AGBA a reasonable basis for pursuing its
tasks as concessionaire which had been negatively affected by the emergency legislation,
including the New Regulatory Framework.
331. In these circumstances, the Arbitral Tribunal considers that Argentina, by failing to restore a
reasonable equilibrium in the concession, aggravated its situation to such extent as to constitute a
breach of its duty under the BIT to afford a fair and equitable treatment to Impregilo’s
237
investment.

The tribunal’s decision thus seems to read the FET obligation as imposing a duty on the government to
not only offer or engage in a renegotiation effort, but to secure an outcome fair to the investor
“restor[ing] a reasonable equilibrium in the concession.” Yet where, as in Impregilo, the claimant in
the treaty dispute is a minority shareholder in the domestic concessionaire, and that the concessionaire
is not a party to the treaty-based dispute before the tribunal, it likely becomes particularly difficult to
identify whether the failure to restore equilibrium was due to the conduct of the government, the
concessionaire, or both parties.
Moreover, in this case, a duty to successfully renegotiate the contract would likely have been
particularly challenging due to the fact that the government – even prior to the country’s financial
crisis and currency devaluation – had been facing various requests by the concessionaire to renegotiate
the deal by reducing its investment commitments and service obligations, and therefore might have
faced counterproposals it was unwilling to accept. Indeed, as the tribunal noted in support of its
finding of liability, the government appeared “reluctant to renegotiate the Concession Contract” and
was concerned about making “adjustments in favor of the [concessionaire] … as this would have
negative effects for the customers whose economic interests required protection.238 In such
circumstances, one can perceive, as Argentina contended, that the failure of renegotiations may have
been due at least in part to the concessionaire’s demands being unreasonable.239 Nevertheless, under
the tribunal’s interpretation of the treaty’s rule, it appears that the government is subject to demands,
standards and attendant potential liabilities that do not similarly apply to concessionaires, much less
the minority shareholders in those companies.
The familiar caveat to any conclusion regarding these decisions again applies: Briefs and awards
demonstrate that not all states, arbitrators, or reviewing judges agree that the FET obligation
incorporates these requirements of good faith, transparency, or administrative due process whether in
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intra-deal reviews or renegotiations, or other circumstances.240 The cases highlighted here are not used
to show what the law is, but what the decision might be, lest any state be unsure what potential
liability arises as a result of investment treaties.
2. Extra-Deal Renegotiations
Extra-deal renegotiations involve intense challenges and pressures, not least because they are usually
unwanted by one party:
Unlike negotiations for the original transaction, which are generally fueled by both sides’ hopes
for future benefits, extra-deal negotiations begin with both parties’ shattered expectations. One
side has failed to achieve the benefits expected from the transaction, and the other is being asked
to give up something for which it bargained hard and which it hoped to enjoy for a long time.
Whereas both parties to the negotiation of a proposed new venture participate willingly, if not
eagerly, one party always participates reluctantly, if not downright unwillingly, in an extra-deal
renegotiation. Beyond mere disappointed expectations, extra-deal renegotiations, by their very
nature, can create bad feeling and mistrust. One side believes it is being asked to give up
something to which it has a legal and moral right. It views the other side as having gone back on
its word, as having acted in bad faith by reneging on the deal. Indeed, the reluctant party may even
feel that it is being coerced into participating in extra-deal renegotiations since a refusal to do so
241
would result in losing the investment it has already made in the transaction.

These characteristics of extra-deal renegotiations are evident in and important for considering treatybased investor-state arbitration. This is primarily because if the investor is the unwilling party that
feels unfairly forced to renegotiate, it can seek treaty-based relief by threatening or pursuing investorstate arbitration. By pursuing this avenue, the investor can try to convince its state counterparty not to
pursue extra-legal renegotiation; and, if the state insists, the investor can seek compensation for any
costs it is asked to incur, thereby undoing if not mitigating the consequences of the renegotiation.
Alternatively, if the investor seeks renegotiation, the government has no recourse under the investment
treaty. Investment treaties give investors, not states, protections and the ability to initiate investor-state
disputes.
This asymmetry can put states at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis their contracting parties,
creating scenarios in which they may be brought back to the negotiating table against their will in
order to save a deal, while their own ability to force investors to renegotiate aspects of the agreement
is weakened. This is especially important given that studies have shown investors – not states – are
commonly the drivers for extra-legal renegotiations. Indeed, one review of 1,000 concession contracts
in the telecommunications, transportation, water and sanitation services, and electricity sectors that
were awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean between the mid-1980s and 2000 found that extralegal renegotiations were “extremely common”242 and in 61 percent of those renegotiations, the
renegotiations were requested by the concessionaire or operator. Only in 26 percent did the
government initiate the renegotiation. The remaining cases consisted of those in which both the
concessionaire and the government sought renegotiation.243
That study shows that firm-led renegotiations are particularly common in cases where the contract
was awarded through competitive bidding as opposed to direct negotiations. This, researchers explain,
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appears to reflect the fact that investors are able to secure contracts by underbidding (e.g., on tariffs) or
overbidding (e.g.. on payments to the government and investment contributions), with the intent or
effect of subsequently opportunistically renegotiating the deal. In contrast, when securing the contract
through direct negotiations, investors are more likely to “secure all the benefits or rents at the start,
making renegotiation unnecessary from the operator’s perspective.”244
Investors are also more likely to seek renegotiation when the contract is structured in a way that the
risk of changes in circumstances and adverse events are born by them (e.g., through a price-cap system
of regulating tariffs) rather than the government (e.g., through a rate-of-return method),245 which may
be due to such factors as capture or corruption, or lack of regulatory strength and capacity to resist
opportunistic renegotiation requests.246
Once renegotiation is sought, investors have strong power to get states back to the negotiating
table:
[T]he operator has significant leverage, because the government is often unable to reject
renegotiation and is usually unwilling to claim failure—and let the operator abandon the
concession—for fear of political backlash and additional transaction costs. In such cases the
operator, through renegotiations, can undermine all the benefits of the bidding- or auction- led
247
competitive process.

Thus, although discussions about foreign investment in infrastructure and other capital intensive
projects frequently mention the phenomenon of the “obsolescing bargain” in which an investor with
significant fixed assets in the host country becomes hostage to government power and discretion,248
the dominance of this narrative obscures a different reality – one in which the government is held
hostage to opportunistic renegotiations.
Against that background, it is especially crucial to review how tribunals have treated extra-legal
renegotiations; and the cases suggest governments have significant cause for concern that these
decisions may greatly tilt the balance of power in favor of investors even where investors already
enjoy important leverage. In particular, investment treaties seem to erect an important shield around
investors protecting them from government attempts to renegotiate agreements, while placing pressure
on governments to come back to the table when requested by the investor.
i. Government-led Renegotiations
Various investment disputes have arisen precisely out of a scenario in which the change was requested
by the government, putting the investor in the position of the reluctant renegotiator. In, response,
investors have used investment arbitration (or the threat of arbitration) to challenge government efforts
to “pressure” them to renegotiate deals.
Investors have succeeded on these claims, with at least some tribunals finding that governments
violate the investment treaties when trying to get their contracting party to renegotiate their deal.249
The motives and methods used to secure renegotiations have also been relevant to tribunals’ views on
liability, as investors – with varying degrees of success – have argued that governments’ “political”
motives and/or exercises of sovereign powers are key factors supporting treaty breach.
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One case highlighting these issues is Vivendi v. Argentina II, in which the tribunal concluded that
government officials in an Argentine province breached the investment treaty by improperly
pressuring the concessionaire to renegotiate the agreement.
In that case, even before the concession was awarded, there was notable opposition to the
privatization of the water services at the heart of the dispute; and after transfer to the concessionaire,
that opposition escalated, fueled by a number of factors, including a change in government, the
concessionaire’s doubling of tariffs charged, lack of certainty among residents and governments about
the conditions of the concession and terms of the contract, and major problems in delivery of water,
including incidents of red turbidity over the course of one to two months, and black turbidity that
lasted over the course of two weeks, neither of which users had previously experienced.250 Media
attention on the concession and its operation intensified; an independent ombudsman advised water
users of their legal rights and remedies regarding issues with payment and service quality; individual
legislators made comments critical of the concession and, like the ombudsman, also gave citizens
information regarding their rights with respect to the concessionaire; the legislature appointed a
special committee to investigate the legitimacy of the concession contract; and the Court of Accounts
issued a report questioning the agreement’s consistency with the law. There was, therefore, notable
pressure on the government to address these concerns; prompting its requests for renegotiations of the
tariff, but also contemplating that the investor would be able to reduce its investment commitments
and obligations to extend service.
Reviewing these events, the tribunal concluded that the government had “mounted an illegitimate
‘campaign’ against the concession, the Concession Agreement, and the ‘foreign’ concessionaire from
the moment it took office, aimed either at reversing the privatization or forcing the concessionaire to
renegotiate (and lower) [the concessionaire’s] tariff’s.”251 The tribunal further declared that the
government’s “so-called regulatory activity constituted ongoing, unfair and inequitable behavior
because it was no more than politically driven arm-twisting aimed at compelling Claimants to agree to
new terms to the Concession Agreement which were acceptable to the new government.”252 Such
conduct, the tribunal determined, violated the FET standard under the treaty.
The tribunal’s finding of liability thus seemed to largely hinge on its view that the government’s
actions were motivated by “political” concerns and through public and governmental means. The
tribunal highlighted the role of the individual legislators, legislature, ombudsman, concession
regulator, and the governor of the province as forming part of this political “campaign” against the
concessionaire and criticized the government’s apparent role in harming, rather than improving, the
relationship between the concessionaire and the public.
This approach raises a number of issues for governments. For one, through such a totality of the
circumstances approach where liability is based on the perception of a “campaign” implemented by a
variety of different actors who are accountable to different individuals and groups within and outside
the government, the tribunal applied a standard that can be breached even if each individual act
making up that “campaign” could not or would not give rise to liability under domestic or international
law.253 This standard may be particularly difficult for states to comply with as many of the actions
alleged to be wrongful here – e.g., comments to the press, communications to the public, government
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responses to public outcries, and legislative establishment of investigative committees – are common
if not encouraged in democratic governments. Indeed, such actions as are often even given enhanced
free speech protections and immunities from discovery and/or liability in order to avoid chilling them.
Moreover, the tribunal’s approach focusing on the “political” motives for the government’s efforts
to renegotiate the contract fails to take into account that governments likely will by their very nature –
and should be – responsive to and driven by political motives as those are ultimately driven by the
needs and demands of constituents they represent, particularly when the contract relates to provision
of essential public services. Just as a project company may seek renegotiation in order to satisfy
shareholders, lenders or other key stakeholders to whom they owe duties, governments may seek
renegotiation in order to respond to and advance the needs of the citizens to whom they are also
accountable.
Other tribunals have similarly focused on the nature or mode of government conduct used to bring
a private party back to the negotiating table.254 In PSEG v. Turkey, when the claimant had sought
government approval to convert its public law contract to a private law one giving it the right to
arbitrate disputes, the government indicated that it would only agree to support the claimant’s
application if the claimant agreed to renegotiate certain aspects of the underlying contract. The
tribunal considered the government’s attempt to impose that condition an improper exercise of
sovereign authority and relied on it when finding that the government had violated the treaty.255
AES v. Hungary is similarly critical of government efforts to use sovereign powers to encourage or
“force” renegotiations:
[I]t cannot be considered a reasonable measure [consistent with the for a state to use its
governmental powers [including its power to implement laws or issue decrees] to force a private
party to change or give up its contractual rights. If the state has the conviction that its contractual
obligations to its investors should no longer be observed (even if it is a commercial contract,
which is the case), the state would have to end such contracts and assume the contractual
256
consequences of such early termination.

With respect to the motives, the AES v. Hungary tribunal said – in contrast to Vivendi II – that
“political” reasons for taking action could weigh against, rather than in favor of liability. That case had
arisen out of Hungary’s actions to address alleged excessive profits obtained by electricity generators
under the country’s pricing regime. The tribunal noted that the level of the companies’ returns had
become “a public issue and something of a political lightning rod in the face of upcoming
elections”;257 but rather than evidencing the irrationality of the government’s conduct, the political
attention on the matter indicated it was a public policy topic of widespread concern that the
government could legitimately address through exercise of its lawmaking powers. If exercise (or
potential exercise) of government authority had the effect of encouraging the investor to renegotiate
the underlying contract then, under the AES tribunal’s reasoning, that fact would not be sufficient to
render the government’s conduct a breach of the investment treaty.
In another departure from the Vivendi II approach, in Electrabel v. Hungary, the tribunal rejected
the claimant’s assertion that Hungary’s actions seeking, inter alia, renegotiations of power purchase
agreements, were improperly driven by “political” motives and thus violated the FET obligation.258The
tribunal stated:
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There is no doubt that by late 2005 and early 2006 there was political and public controversy in
Hungary over the perceived high level of profits made by Hungarian Generators, including
Dunamenti. However, politics is what democratic governments necessarily address; and it is not,
ipso facto, evidence of irrational or arbitrary conduct for a government to take into account
259
political or even populist controversies in a democracy subject to the rule of law.

ii. Firm-led Renegotiation
Other cases have looked at government conduct in response to investor requests for extra-deal
renegotiations, and have signaled that even when the government had no legal duty under the relevant
contract to enter into or conclude those renegotiations, investment treaties may impose certain
requirements regarding how to respond to those renegotiation requests. In Biwater v. Tanzania, for
instance, the tribunal recognized that the government had no legal obligation under the contract to
enter into the broad renegotiations sought by the water services concessionaire, but that it nevertheless
decided to accommodate the concessionaire and engage in those discussions. Rather than rejecting the
claimant’s claim that the government was liable for its conduct in those renegotiations on the ground
that the government had no duty to engage in them in the first place, the tribunal proceeded to
scrutinize the government’s approach to procedural and substantive aspects of those talks. It ultimately
concluded that the government performed the renegotiation in good faith, was not unreasonable in its
decision to require the renegotiations be conducted within a limited timeframe,260 and was also not
unreasonable in its decision to reject the concessionaire’s proposal or to require the concessionaire to
accept certain of the government’s own terms.261
This decision, similar to PSEG v. Turkey, suggests that investors dissatisfied with the process or
outcome of investor-initiated extra-deal renegotiations may be able to use investment treaties to
challenge the procedures adopted and stances taken by governments in those talks, potentially
providing them leverage over their government counterparty to the contract.
D. Harm Caused by Conduct of Third Persons
In a number of cases, the tribunals have examined whether, when, and to what extent a government
has an obligation to protect an investor against physical, legal, and economic harm262 directly caused
by third persons and citizens of the host country including, but not limited to, customers of the
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investor263 and other branches and entities of government264 . This duty is treated as part of the FET
obligation and/or the obligation to provide foreign investors “(full) protection and security.”265
Relevant to private investment of infrastructure and related public services, investors have argued
that treaties impose on governments certain duties to protect investors and investments from harm
through ensuring that investors have access to legal mechanisms to safeguard and assert their rights in
disputes with other private or governmental individuals or entities, including consumers or regulators
of concessionaires;266 protecting investors against legal and economic changes that impair their
business;267 and protecting investors from disruptions in business operations and physical harm to
property through actions of worker, environmental, protestors, squatters, or others.268
A number of cases have dealt with the particular issue of the government’s role in easing or
exacerbating tensions between the concessionaire and the public, including its customers and workers.
In Vivendi v. Argentina II, the tribunal took issue with the public statements made by and actions of
individual legislators, the legislature, the ombudsman, the Court of Accounts, executive officials, and
the regulating entity – conduct that the tribunal viewed as “devastating … the economic viability” 269
of the concession by “undermin[ing]” the concessionaire and the legitimacy of the concession
contract,270 thereby explicitly or implicitly discouraging customers’ payment of their water bills and
putting the concessionaire in a financial position where it was effectively compelled to renegotiate:
Under the fair and equitable standard, there is no doubt about a government’s obligation not to
disparage and undercut a concession (a “do no harm” standard) that has properly been granted,
albeit by a predecessor government based on falsities and motivated by a desire to rescind or force
271
a renegotiation.
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In another water services investment, the tribunal similarly held that the respondent state violated the
investment treaty by making public statements that undermined the legitimacy of the concessionaire in
the eyes of the public:
622. The Arbitral Tribunal notes that at an early stage of the Project, the Republic did actively
manage the expectations of the public with regard to the speed of improvements of the network. In
his State of the Nation address to Parliament on 12 February 2004, the President of Tanzania
stated as follows:
“The decision to privatize water and sewerage services in Dar es Salaam City was not an easy one
to take. But we had to take a decision having analyzed the reality of our situation, and carefully
weighing the pros and cons. Finally we took a decision and concessionary (sic) the infrastructure
to City Water from 1 August 2003. Surprisingly, even when the concession has not run for six
months some people are becoming impatient wanting all problems to disappear immediately. That
is not realistic. We have lived with these problems, and countenanced them for many years. How
can one expect City Water to resolve all of them in six months?”.
…
624.In May 2005, the Republic’s attitude dramatically changed. Far from seeking to manage the
public’s expectations, the Minister acted in such a way as to undermine the public’s confidence in
City Water, especially during the press conference of 13 May 2005 where the Minister referred to
City Water’s poor performance and informed the public that the Lease Contract had been
terminated and that DAWASCO was taking over.
…
627.The position in May, therefore, was that despite its poor record, and despite all the public
criticisms, City Water still had a right to the proper and unhindered performance of the contractual
termination process. In the Arbitral Tribunal’s view, the Republic’s public statements at this time
constituted an unwarranted interference in this. They inflamed the situation, and polarised public
opinion still further, thereby ensuring that from May 2005 onwards, the process by which the
Lease Contract was terminated and City Water was removed did not – and could not – follow a
normal contractual course.
628.The Arbitral Tribunal concludes that in acting in such a way in May 2005, the Republic did
272
not comply with the fair and equitable treatment principle.

Ultimately, in Biwater v. Tanzania, the tribunal determined that the government’s breach of the treaty
did not cause the investor any monetary damages; nevertheless it and Vivendi II counsel caution by
governments when communicating to the public regarding what to expect from and what their rights
are with respect to their public services providers. These decisions prompt concern that governments
will be unduly reluctant to take positions on concessionaires or share information with the public.
These decisions may contradict domestic laws providing privileges or immunities to such conduct in
order to ensure that fear of liability does not hinder public speech.

VIII. Other Issues
This paper focuses on addressing what investment treaties mean for investments in infrastructure and
related public services by addressing when investment treaties cover those investments, how they
impact the pre-project phases, and how they are relevant for ongoing operations. Yet other issues are
also important that must be kept in mind and that merit deeper examination. These include questions
relating to how investment treaties impact contract termination;273 what government individuals and
entities can trigger state liability; and what implications treaty-based investor-state arbitration has for a
272
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range of crucial topics such as strength of incentives for parties to litigate or resolve disputes, the
extent of state liability, the amount of litigation costs, the nature of contracting parties’ rights,
obligations, claims and defenses, and the procedural and evidentiary issues that may impact the
success of parties’ cases.

IX. Conclusion
Countries globally have entered into thousands of investment treaties protecting foreign “investments”
and “investors”, broadly defined. Like political risk insurance, these treaties are tools investors can use
to secure compensation for damages caused by the host state’s conduct. Such protections can be
particularly important in the eyes of investors whose investments require large sunk costs and
significant commitments of time in the host country, face risks associated with high degrees of
uncertainty regarding future legal and economic conditions affecting the investment, and involve
activities of heightened public and political interest.
These features are all common features of investments in infrastructure projects (and are also
frequently characteristic of investments in the extractive industries). Thus, investors in infrastructure
projects are likely to be interested in benefitting from the added buffer against host-state conduct that
investment treaties can provide and, in fact, have used those treaties in order to challenge allegedly
wrongful government conduct in a growing body of disputes.
For governments, however, the treaties can bring unanticipated challenges, risks and costs.
Crucially, investment treaties are capable of modifying the legal framework that would otherwise
govern an investment project, enabling the investor to invoke a set of rights and recover damages that
would have been unavailable under the contract or domestic law applicable to the project. In some
circumstances, this outcome can help ensure investors are not abused through egregious government
conduct that might nevertheless be valid under the law of the host jurisdiction. Yet it also threatens to
upset the balances between public rights and private interests, and mechanisms of governance and
accountability that many jurisdictions have carefully struck.

59

Lise Johnson

Author contacts:
Lise Johnson
Senior Legal Researcher – Investment Law and Policy
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment
Columbia Law School
435 W. 116th Street
New York, NY 10027

Email: lisejjohnson@gmail.com

60

